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1. Introduction 
 
 
This report investigates the scale of the UK tax gap, and tax evasion in particular, in 
the UK and what can be done about it. 
 
The report suggests  that the UK‟s tax gap may now be £122 billion a year. This is an 
increase from 2010 when PCS last commissioned Richard Murphy to estimate the tax 
gap. It was  estimated at that time, that the loss each year was £95 billion with £25 
billion of tax being owed at any time. It is  now estimated that  the annual loss has 
increased to a total of £122 billion a year.  
 
The tax gap matters because at £122 billion a year the tax gap is only a little less than 
the annual budget for the NHS.  It is also big enough to cover the entire UK education 
budget with more than £20 billion left over. That should make this issue one of the 
highest priorities on any politician‟s agenda. The troubling fact is that this does not 
appear to be the case at present.   
 
The tax gap is the difference between the amount of tax that should be paid in the UK 
and the amount of tax that is actually paid. It is made up of tax avoided and evaded 
and of uncollected tax that is known to be owed but is either never paid or is paid late.  
 
This report estimates that tax evasion might cost the UK £85 billion a year whilst tax 
avoidance might impose a cost of £19 billion a year and tax not paid could result in a 
loss of income of £18 billion a year. 
 
In a time when all major UK political parties seem committed to austerity measures 
the size of the tax gap is a key variable in the equation that determines economic and 
social policy.  
 
Put very simply, if the tax gap is small the government has more to spend. If it is big 
then governments think they must make choices about how to deal with budget 
deficits and we have seen in recent years that it is public services and ordinary people 
that suffer as a result of such decisions. The consequence is that for the very many 
people in the UK who are either dependent on the government for all or part of their 
income, or who are dependent upon government services, such as the NHS, for their 
well-being, the size of the tax gap can have a direct impact on the quality of their lives.  
 
PCS first made this important point in 2010 when we were the first organisation to 
publish an estimate for tax evaded in the UK apart from HMRC. That report was 
ground breaking when it was published. In 2010 HMRC admitted the whole tax gap 
was  £42 billioni (a figure they have steadily revised down since then to £35 billion in 
2013ii). In contrast what the report commissioned from Richard Murphy showed was 
that the amount of tax HMRC   were not recovering - because their political masters 
were not giving them the resources required to do so - was vastly bigger than HMRC 
admitted. What this new report shows is that things have, if anything, got worse in the 
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meantime whilst HMRC has been starved of ever more resources over the intervening 
years, costing thousands of PCS members their jobs whilst decimating the valuable 
service they supplied to the UK public.  
 
Since 2008 PCS and its members have been at the forefront of the tax justice 
campaign in the UK. We have done that in an attempt to preserve our members‟ jobs 
and to protect the services they supply. We have also done so to show that if only the 
tax gap was properly tackled we would have a very different economic outlook in the 
UK. The budget deficit, trumpeted as the need for austerity measures, cuts to 
services, pay freezes and attacks on those in receipt of social security payments, 
would not be closed as a result of merely collecting the tax evaded in the UK economy 
but a large amount of money that could be invested in good quality public services 
would be “recovered” by the Treasury.  
 
PCS has argued consistently since 2010 that there is no need for the austerity 
measures now crippling the UK economy and which are depriving so many of jobs, 
opportunity and hope as well as causing cuts in health and education. Our argument 
is as ideological as - but on the opposite side to - the government‟s and is that the tax 
gap is a crucial factor that should be at the centre of economic debate in the UK and 
which could transform our economic prospects if only it was properly addressed. 
 
Richard Murphy, who wrote the attached report, also looks at the impact of staffing 
cuts in HMRC on the tax gap. In 2005 HMRC had 92,000 staff. By 2016 it is expected 
to have around 52,000. Across the UK HMRC has abandoned its local office structure 
and its face-to-face contact with the local communities it serves. Local knowledge has 
been lost and trust has been foregone as a result. In its place we now have call 
centres whose staff, through no fault of their own, have not had sufficient training for 
the jobs they are being asked to do whilst tax investigators now have one hand tied 
behinds their back at all times by the constraints placed upon them by a lack of 
resources. It is no wonder that the tax gap remains a persistent problem. 
 
There is as a consequence a desperate need to invest in HMRC if the tax gap is to be 
tackled. Tackling that tax gap is vital if public services are to be preserved and if the 
UK is to get back to work. It is also important if the government is to support honest 
businesses and honest taxpayers and uphold the rule of law. This is an issue which in 
the run up to the 2015 General Election really needs to be in the voting public‟s mind. 
Think about it when people ask for your vote and remember when doing so that we 
are all enriched by good public services. 
 
 
Mark Serwotka 
General Secretary 
PCS – the Public and Commercial Services Union 
160 Falcon Road  
London 
SW11 2LN. 
 
September 2014 
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2. Summary 
 
 
The government claims there is no alternative to the austerity agenda. Jobs 
and pay are being cut, benefits slashed and public services closed; small 
businesses are struggling to survive on our high streets. A simple part of the 
solution is to close the tax gap, which involves two things: making those most 
able pay their fair share of taxes and beating tax cheats. 
 
In 2010 PCS published the most comprehensive calculation of the UK tax gap 
undertaken at the time. The report by Tax Research UK estimated the tax gap 
at £120 billion. This was made up of £70 billion in evaded tax, £25 billion in 
avoided tax and £25 billion in tax paid late. 
 
At the time the government criticised this figure as being far too high and 
instead estimated a tax gap of £35 billion in 2011/12. 
 
Campaigning by PCS, UK Uncut and others about the high profile tax 
avoidance activities of companies such as Google, Starbucks and Amazon 
along with celebrities like Jimmy Carr, Chris Moyles and Gary Barlow, have 
pushed the issue into the media spotlight. 
 
This pamphlet is a summary of a new report „Tax Justice UK‟ written for PCS. It 
makes a new estimate of the tax gap, which continues to be significantly higher 
than the HMRC estimate. This estimate, which is £119.4bn for financial year 
2013/14, includes reductions in the estimates of tax avoidance and tax debt, 
but a significant increase in the estimated tax loss from evasion. 
 
It includes significant new data and a much more comprehensive analysis of 
tax evasion. It shows that tax evasion is higher than previously estimated. It 
concludes that the government should tighten up legislation and reverse the 
counterproductive cuts in HM Revenue and Customs staffing. 
 
Defining the tax gap 
 
The tax gap is made up of three parts.  
  Tax debt – non-collection; tax that is not paid by someone who knows that 
they owe it, but who doesn‟t pay, or delays payment.   Tax avoidance – tax that is lost when a person claims to arranges their 
affairs to minimise tax within the law in the UK, or in other countries.  
 Tax evasion in 2014   
  
 6 
 Tax evasion – tax lost when a person or company deliberately and 
unlawfully fails to declare income that they know is taxable or claims 
expenses that are not allowed.  
 
Tax debt 
 
The amount of debt outstanding has fallen in recent years, but the amount of 
debt written off as irrecoverable or discharged by HMRC during each year is 
growing. In 2013/14 estimate of tax debt is £18.2bn. 
 
This figure is down on the £25bn of tax debt that was estimated in 2008. This 
largely reflects a difference in the method of calculation we have now used that 
makes the figure directly comparable with the data for tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, which was not previously the case. 
 
Tax avoidance 
 
Total tax avoidance is estimated to be at least £19.1bn for 2013/14. The figure 
is lower than the £25bn estimated in 2008, which reflects declining corporation 
tax rates (which means the amount avoided also declines, automatically), 
declining capital gains tax rates, and a likely decline in non-domicile activity as 
a result of legislative changes as well as caution being made in other 
estimates.  
 
Tax evasion 
 
The main area considered by the report is tax evasion. This work draws on 
data to examine areas which the HMRC estimate of the tax gap does not 
address. The report indicates that tax evasion is by far the largest of the three 
tax gaps. 
 
This report estimates that tax evasion costs the UK £73.4bn in 2011/12 (see 
table 1) rising to £82.1bn in 2013/14 (see table 2). 
 
There is more than one type of tax evasion. The following types of evasion are 
considered in this report but are themselves not exclusive or complete. They 
are, however, likely to cover the more common causes of the UK‟s tax gap 
resulting from tax evasion: 
  Tax evasion in the shadow economy. The shadow economy represents 
economic activities that are not recorded or declared to avoid 
government regulation or taxation.  
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 Tax lost as a result of other criminal or fraudulent activity in the UK 
economy.  Capital Gains Tax and Inheritance Tax and offshore tax evasion.  Tax evasion on investment and rental income. 
 
Each of these issues is considered in turn in this report. Table 1 below 
identifies the Tax Research UK 2011/12 estimate. HMRC‟s estimate £22.3bn1 
is also included and the difference. 
 
Tax evasion Item  Tax Research HMRC  Difference  
Tax Research 
Estimates 
Trading in the 
shadow economy 
40.3 9.9 30.4 
Untaxed proceeds 
of fraud and other 
crime 
6.5   6.5 
Capital gains tax 3.8 0.1 3.7 
Inheritance tax 6.6 0.4 6.2 
Offshore tax abuse 4.3   4.3 
Total 61.5 10.4 51.1 
HMRC estimates Criminal attacks on 
the tax system 
4.7 4.7 0 
Error 2.9 2.9 0 
Failure to take care 4.3 4.3 0 
Total 11.9 11.9 0 
Total tax gap  73.4 22.3 51.1 
 
Table 1: Comparison between Tax Research UK and HMRC tax evasion 
figures for financial year 2011/12. 
 
Tax evasion in the shadow economy  
 
The report by Tax Research UK refers to detailed earlier work that estimates 
that up to 10% of all net sales income in the UK economy may not be recorded 
for tax purposes. In 2011/12 this was likely to have represented £100bn of 
unrecorded sales income. Based on this estimate, £40.3bn of unrecorded tax 
of has gone unpaid in 2011/12.  
 
The estimate of unrecorded income in the UK economy made by Tax 
Research UK was based on VAT gap data published by both HMRC in 
                                                        
1
 HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2013, tax gap estimates 2011/12, Official Statistics Release, 
October 2013. Note: small rounding differences arise. 
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successive tax gap reports2 and by the European Union3. The estimate 
specifically excluded data on criminal attacks on the tax system and bad debt. 
The resulting estimates of VAT lost and turnover of almost exactly 10% of the 
likely sums owing, correlate with some authoritative estimates of the size of the 
UK shadow economy4.  
 
Tax lost as a result of other criminal or fraudulent activity in the UK 
economy 
 
The report goes on to use data from The National Fraud Authority‟s „Annual 
Fraud Indicator Report for 20135 to estimate the tax loss. The estimate is 
careful to consider only those areas where it is likely that a tax liability should 
arise and to also exclude the possibility of double counting activity that might 
have already been considered as part of the shadow economy. 
 
The National Fraud Authority (NFA) estimated that fraud against the public 
sector amounted to about £20.6bn in 2012. The total procurement and grant 
frauds have been excluded as they may be covered by estimates of tax lost to 
the shadow economy.  
 
The estimate the NFA has made of fraud against the UK private sector is 
approximately £15.9bn per annum.  
 
In the financial services sector the NFA used Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) data, which showed fraud at £5.4bn in 2012. The 
NFA also identified £9.1bn of fraud against individuals.  
 
The report removes a number of elements to avoid double counting and 
identifies taxable income amounting to approximately £21.8bn in 2012. That 
estimation would indicate that the tax loss arising in 2011/12 on this 
unrecorded income is £6.5bn.  
 
Capital gains, inheritance and offshore tax evasion 
 
The report considers these areas in detail. It recognises that estimating the tax 
gap in relation to capital gains, inheritance and off-shoring is difficult. However, 
                                                        
2
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/measuring-tax-gaps 
3
 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/
vat-gap.pdf 
4
 F Schneider and C Williams (2013) The Shadow Economy, Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London. 
5
 National Fraud Authority, annual fraud Indicator report 2013 
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an analysis of available data indicates that tax evasion is likely and significant. 
The report uses available data to make tentative estimates of the tax gap 
resulting from capital gains, inheritance and off-shoring. 
 
The conclusion of a review of both share and property transactions is that the 
estimated tax loss from capital gains tax was £3.8bn in 2011/12. A review of 
inheritance tax indicates that £6.6 billion of additional inheritance tax might be 
due annually as a result. It is estimated that offshore tax evasion could cost the 
UK £4.3bn a year in lost tax revenue.  
 
HMRC estimates 
 
The HMRC official estimate6, records three categories of tax loss which the 
report has included as tax evasion: 
  Tax lost due to criminal attacks on the tax system, stated to amount to 
£4.7bn in 2011/127;  £2.9bn lost to errors in that year;  £4.3bn lost to failure to take reasonable care. 
 
Rental and investment income 
 
Two further areas of income which the report indicates have the potential for 
significant levels of tax evasion are rental and investment income. While the 
report highlights the scale of potential for evasion, further work is necessary 
before an estimate of tax loss can be made, especially if the risk of double 
counting is to be avoided. 
 
The tax gap over time 
 
Table 2 below is an extrapolation base data for each on the basis of growth in 
GDP based on the 2014 budget and forecasts to the rise in VAT in the autumn 
statement 2013. The extrapolation shows that in 2013/14 the tax lost to 
evasion was £82.1bn. 
   
                                                        
6 HMRC, Measuring Tax Gaps 2013, tax gap estimates 2011/12, Official Statistics Release, 
October 2013. 
7
 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/tax-gaps/mtg-2013.pdf 
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Table 2: Estimating the tax gap 2012/13 to 2018/19 
 
So what can be done about the tax gap? 
 
There is a great deal that can be done to tackle both tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. The report suggests a number of measures that need to be taken: 
  The introduction of a proper anti-avoidance rule into UK tax law.   The introduction of country-by-country reporting for multinational 
corporations.  Reform small business taxation to discourage avoidance and tackle tax 
evasion.   Enforce proper regulation of companies in the UK to ensure that they file 
their accounts and tax returns and pay the taxes that they owe.  Lastly, and most importantly, a reversal of the cuts to staff in HMRC and 
at Companies House, taking on more staff at both to ensure that HMRC 
can collect the taxes the country so badly needs. 
 
Staffing cuts in HMRC  
 
The 2014 Tax Research UK report looks in detail at the impact of staffing cuts 
in HMRC on the tax gap. In 2005, HMRC had 92,000 staff. It has now less than 
62,000 and by 2016 it is expected to have around 52,000 staff, a cut of almost 
43% in just over a decade. 
 
HMRC has closed its local office structure and plans to close all 281 of its 
enquiry centres and its face-to-face contact with the local communities it 
serves. During 2012, 2.5 million tax payers visited HMRC enquiry centres and 
over 340,000 made a face to face appointment with a member of staff in order 
to comply with their tax duties and receive advice on their benefit entitlement.  
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HMRC‟s own customer service surveys show it is not meeting taxpayers‟ 
expectations. One important way they do so is by not collecting tax from 
everyone who owes it to create a level playing field in the UK economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the government has argued that it is reducing the tax gap, the report 
shows that the tax gap is as large as it was in 2008. While the effect of the 
recession and a different method of calculating tax debt have reduced the 
estimates of tax avoidance and debt in the report, the estimate of tax evasion 
has significantly increased. 
 
In any event the estimate of the tax gap in the Tax Research UK report 
remains over three times higher than the official HMRC estimate. 
 
Further resource cuts are planned by this government. The cuts planned and 
implemented by this government will take public spending, as a proportion of 
GDP, back to levels seen in the immediate post war period. This will mean 
further cuts in welfare and vital public services. Reducing tax avoidance, 
evasion and debt could significantly boost government income and so 
undermine the Government‟s argument that there is no alternative to austerity. 
 
As we approach the general election it is clear that there is a real appetite for 
the issue of tax justice to be addressed. PCS has played a leading role in 
drawing the tax gap to the public‟s attention and has helped create an 
environment in which organisations like UK Uncut, and others have been able 
to highlight the injustice that the tax gap causes. 
 
Tackling the tax gap is an important element in an alternative to a programme 
of austerity and cuts. We will never entirely close the tax gap but with the 
political will to take serious steps to address the issue, the economic outlook 
for the country could look very different indeed from that which we are told we 
face at present. 
 
 
 
 
Richard Murphy 
Director 
Tax Research LLP 
 
September 2014
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3. Putting the tax gap in context 
 
 
It seems that to many people – and most especially to HM Revenue & Customs - that 
the tax gap is a technical issue, or maybe a management tool. It is, of course, both of 
those things, but it is also much more significant than either implies. In this chapter the 
link between the UK‟s tax gap and the state of the UK economy is explored. To truly 
appreciate the tax gap‟s significance it has to be understood that properly measuring 
and then effectively tackling the tax gap could transform the way we look at both the 
economy and the broader economic and political outlook for the UK.  
 
Despite all the claims that have been made by a great many politicians, it was not 
government overspending that caused the financial crisis that engulfed the UK and 
much of the developed world in 2008. We know it was the failure of the banks that 
caused the economy to topple over in that year. What we also know is that a major 
reason for the debt crisis that led to bank failure was that banks had lent excessively 
to many who had limited ability to repay their debts. This was because real wages had 
not been growing in many economies for a long time and lending was making good 
the short fall. Wealth inequality grew significantly as a result.   
 
That inequality meant by 2008 there was far too much money in the hands of a very 
wealthy minority in society who then lent it through the banks to ordinary people who 
could not make ends meet without recourse to loans. Many of those who were 
borrowers in 2008 have since then faced the blunt hard end of austerity in their lives. 
The banks, and as a result the wealthy who had money in them, were in the meantime 
bailed out by governments, including the UK‟s. Those, on the other hand, to whom 
banks lent money were left with falling wages, less to spend, the prospects of 
unemployment or zero hours contracts and, for some, very marginal self-employments 
from which they have earned less than the minimum wage. For all those reasons tax 
yields fell, significantly. In the UK that banking failure combined with a steep decline in 
tax revenues created a major economic crisis. The implications can be summarised in 
just one graph: 
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Figure one 
Source: HM Treasury budget data up to Budget 2014 
 
From 1997 to 2007 the UK economy had appeared to run well. That was one reason 
why Labour won three elections in a row. For several years the government actually 
spent less than it generated in tax revenue and debt was repaid. Then, in the 
aftermath of the dot.com crash the government invested in the economy, and ran a 
deficit for a number of years that was almost exactly equivalent to the amount it 
invested in new schools, hospitals roads and similar capital items, as indicated by the 
blue line in Figure 1 running almost parallel, but slightly below, the red line. Despite 
everything that has been said about Labour‟s economic management and reckless 
borrowing this was an era when government finances looked to be under control. 
 
Since 2008 the world has changed. As is obvious from Figure 1, it was not spending 
that went out of control in 2008. Spending did, inevitably, increase but that was 
because so many people were put out of work as a result of the crash in 2008 but it 
was not that spending that caused the deficit. It was a lack of tax as a result of the 
collapse in banking activity that caused the deficit, together with HMRC not collecting 
 Tax evasion in 2014   
  
 14 
revenues due for a variety of reasons including the programme of job cuts that Labour 
had already put in place by the time that the economic crisis erupted, and which they 
did not cancel even when it was clear that collecting every penny of tax due was a 
national priority. 
 
An enormous gap between income and spending opened up that the government has 
yet to fill, although it now predicts it will do so by 2019. This forecast should, however, 
be taken with a pinch of salt: since 2010 government projections have always seemed 
to suggest that it will balance its books about five years after the date on which the 
forecast has been made and so far they are a very long way from doing so. 
 
Table 2 below gives clear indication of the scale of the borrowing that the financial 
crisis has given rise to: 
 
Year 
Government 
income 
Government 
spending 
Net 
borrowing 
Cumulative 
borrowing 
 
£'billion £'billion £'billion £'billion 
1997-98 316 322 -7 -7 
1998-99 336 331 5 -2 
1999-00 359 344 15 13 
2000-01 383 367 16 29 
2001-02 390 390 0 30 
2002-03 396 419 -23 7 
2003-04 419 454 -35 -29 
2004-05 451 491 -40 -68 
2005-06 486 523 -38 -106 
2006-07 520 550 -30 -136 
2007-08 548 583 -35 -171 
2008-09 534 630 -96 -267 
2009-10 513 670 -157 -423 
2010-11 551 688 -137 -560 
2011-2012 573 694 -121 -681 
2012-2013 593 702 -108 -789 
2013-2014 620 716 -96 -885 
2014-2015 648 732 -84 -969 
2015-2016 675 743 -68 -1,037 
2016-2017 711 753 -42 -1,079 
2017-2018 734 759 -25 -1,104 
2018-2019 778 773 5 -1,099 
Total 11,533 12,632 -1,099 
 
 
Figure 2 
Source: HM Treasury budget data up to Budget 2014 
Data highlighted in red represents forecasts 
 
 
From April 1997 until April 2014 the government was expected to have borrowed £885 
billion. Of that just £171 billion was borrowed before April 2008. That means that the 
global banking crisis has already resulted in borrowing of £714 billion, which is well 
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over four times the sum borrowed during the eleven-year period before the crisis 
erupted. In addition, the current government is suggesting that over the next five year 
period for which forecasts are now available that they will bring the state‟s books back 
into balance but they will still borrow another £214 billion before that is achieved, 
which is more than Labour did between 1997 and 2008 (although in fairness the data 
has not been adjusted for inflation). 
 
Why does this all this data on deficits matter? It matters because when HMRC first 
published a tax gap estimate the tax gap they did so for 2007-08. HMRC said that in 
that year the tax gap was £42 billioniii. The budget deficit in that same year was £35 
billion and it had not been more than £40 billion over the preceding years, as noted 
above. In other words, at that time, HMRC‟s own estimate of the tax gap suggested 
that if only the tax gap could have been effectively addressed over the previous 
eleven years, and had been of broadly similar amount each year, then it would have 
required less than half the tax gap to have been recovered to have ensured that the 
Labour government of that period would have entered the recession with no net 
borrowing having been incurred over the previous decade or so.  
 
Alternatively, if the tax gap was actually £95 billion of combined tax avoidance and tax 
evasion at that time, as PCS suggested it to be in 2010, then the proportion of the tax 
gap that would have needed to be recovered to ensure that no net borrowing would 
have been incurred over that period to 2008 would have been much less.  In all 
likelihood a recovery rate of less than one third of the total tax gap would have been 
needed (having allowed for inflation) to ensure that no net government borrowing 
would have been required from 1997 to 2008 inclusive if the PCS estimate of the tax 
gap was correct. 
 
What is immediately clear as a result is that tackling the tax gap has the power to 
transform the economy and economic outlook of the UK. What is also obvious is that 
this thinking was not anywhere in the mainstream before 2009, which was the first 
year HMRC began publishing anything close to a comprehensive tax gap estimate, 
largely as a result of pressure from the trade union and tax justice movements. 
 
There is a final point to be made on this issue at this point. This is that whilst the 
government says that austerity will close the government deficit, the evidence of its 
own data does not support this claim. For the last five budgets the Treasury has 
claimed that a balanced budget will happen in approximately five years time. The 
evidence is that this claim has been consistently wrong: the goal seems to move one 
year further away each time a forecast is made – remaining as a result at a seemingly 
fixed time in the future whilst in the meantime the deficit and the borrowing continue, 
as figures one and two show.  
 
What this suggests is that austerity is not working as an economic policy, even if it is 
assumed that it is rational for that policy to aim for a balanced budget (which neither 
PCS nor the author of this report believe to be the case). So far no significant 
progress towards that aim of a balanced budget has been achieved; the budget deficit 
in 2013-14 is the same as that in 2008-09.  
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In that case what this report is arguing is that closing the tax gap would be a better 
way of reducing the deficit than a programme of austerity. More importantly, it also 
suggests that closing the tax gap, by changing economic thinking on government 
spending, offers the possibility of a very different economic agenda, in which austerity 
is replaced with investment for growth. That, this report suggests, is what the UK 
really needs.   
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4. Tax evasion – what it is 
 
 
Tax evasion is the crime of not declaring income to a tax authority that has a right to 
know about it and the crime of claiming expenses for offset against a taxable income 
when knowing that those expenses should not be claimed for that purpose. 
 
The word crime in both parts of that definition is important. The tax evader either 
knowingly breaks the law or does so with reckless disregard for the consequences. 
This means that tax evasion is different from tax avoidance, which is more often 
referred to in the mainstream press.  
 
Tax avoidance is commonly undertaken by large businesses and high net worth 
individuals who can employ an army of accountants and lawyers to find loopholes in 
the laws and regulations of either one country, or a number of countries, to make sure 
that they do not pay tax whilst claiming that they were not breaking any law, 
anywhere, whilst achieving that objective.  
 
That same army of lawyers and accountants also provide these companies and 
people with their defence against a charge of tax evasion. If someone has an opinion 
from a lawyer that what they are doing is legal then it is virtually impossible to charge 
them with tax evasion; they are only tax avoiding in that case, however abusive the 
arrangement that they are using might be. 
 
Tax evasion is, as a result, undertaken by people who do not use lawyers and 
accountants to cover their tracks but who do instead knowingly have income that they 
do not properly declare to their tax authority, which in the UK means HMRC 
 
The fact that all tax evasion has this characteristic in common does not mean there is 
only one type of tax evasion. The following types of evasion are considered in this 
report but are themselves not exclusive or complete. They are, however, likely to 
cover the more common causes of the UK‟s tax gap resulting from tax evasion: 
 
1. Tax evasion in the shadow economy. The shadow economy represents 
economic activities that are not recorded or declared to avoid government 
regulation or taxation. Part is unrecorded wages and the rest is represented by 
undeclared business incomeiv; 
  
2. Tax lost as a result of other criminal or fraudulent activity in the UK economy; 
 
3. Misrepresentation and negligence on tax returns; 
 
4. Tax lost on other forms of UK income and gains e.g. rental income, investment 
income, undeclared capital gains tax and inheritance tax evasion; 
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5. Offshore tax evasion. 
 
Each of these issues is considered in turn in this report before the economic 
consequences of the losses are estimated and ways of addressing the identified tax 
evasion are suggested. 
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5. The shadow economy– the biggest part of tax evasion 
 
 
This report would have addressed the issue of the tax evasion in the UK‟s shadow 
economy but for the fact that in May 2014 Tax Research UK published an estimate of 
the tax lost to the UK economy as a result of that activityv. That research was funded 
by but was not undertaken for Oxfam GB and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust: 
the findings were the sole responsibility of Tax Research UK.  
 
What the research suggested was that up to 10% of all sales income in the UK 
economy as a whole may not be recorded for tax purposes. In 2011/12 this was likely 
to have represented £100 billion of unrecorded sales income. The figure will, 
obviously, have increased by now and could, based on GDP growth, be as much as 
£112 billion a year. 
 
Based on this estimate, unrecorded total tax of maybe £40 billion may have gone 
unpaid in 2011/12 and that tax loss could now be as high as £47 billion a year, having 
allowed for expected changes in the VAT gap since 2011/12. In this context it is 
important to note that the VAT gap is defined, like the tax gap, as the difference 
between the amount of VAT that should be paid in the UK if the law worked as 
parliament and HMRC think it should and the amount of VAT that is actually paid. 
 
The estimate of unrecorded sales income in the UK economy made by Tax Research 
UK was based on VAT gap data published by both HMRC in successive tax gap 
reportsvi and by the European Unionvii. The estimate made, specifically excluded data 
on criminal attacks on the tax system and bad debt. The resulting estimates of VAT 
lost and turnover of almost exactly 10% of the likely sums owing, do, by coincidence, 
happen to almost exactly agree with some of the most widely quoted academic 
estimates of the size of the UK shadow economy. For example, Prof Friedrich 
Schneider of Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria and Prof Colin Williams of 
Sheffield University suggested in 2013 that the long-term data for the size of the 
shadow economy in the UK was as followsviii: 
 
Year Size of UK shadow economy 
(%) 
1997 13.0 
1999 12.8 
2001 12.6 
2003 12.5 
2005 12.4 
2007 12.2 
2009 10.9 
2011 11.0 
2012 10.3 
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Average 12.0 
 
Figure 3 
Source, Schneider and Williams as referenced in text 
 
For comparison, the estimated UK VAT gap according to HMRC (using originally 
published data in each case as far as possible, based on tax gap reports, and stating 
numbers in later years before and after bad debt and criminal fraud) and the 
equivalent data from the EU have been: 
 
Year 
HMRC 
estimate 
including bad 
debt and 
criminal 
attacks % 
HMRC 
estimate 
excluding 
bad debt and 
criminal 
attacks % 
EU estimate 
for the UK % 
2002-03 15.7 
 
12.7 
2003-04 12.1 
 
9.9 
2004-05 11.8 
 
11.0 
2005-06 15.4 
 
11.3 
2006-07 13.3 
 
12.7 
2007-08 11.7 9.4 12.7 
2008-09 14.2 10.3 14.6 
2009-10 11.6 7.9 13.5 
2010-11 10.4 8.7 13.0 
2011-12 10.4 8.1 13.0 
Average 12.7 9.5 12.5 
 
Figure 4 
Sources: HMRC tax gap data, author’s calculations and European Union as 
noted in text 
 
These estimates and those by Schneider and Williams are made using very different 
methodologies: their convergence provides strong evidence that suggests the shadow 
economy is in the ranges indicated. 
 
It will be noted that the EU estimate of the UK‟s VAT gap does not agree with HMRC‟s 
suggestion that this is falling in recent years. The Tax Research estimate used to 
estimate the tax lost to the UK averaged the HMRC and EU estimates of the UK VAT 
gap having allowed in both cases for likely bad debt and criminal attack costs. The 
resulting estimated loss remains below the Schneider and Williams estimate of the 
size of the UK shadow economy. 
 
The estimated rate of loss on the unrecorded sales income that Tax Research 
suggests arise in the UK economy has been estimated as being 40% of the total 
unrecorded income. This estimate takes into account income tax, national insurance, 
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VAT and corporation tax lost even though the estimate is based on VAT gap data. 
That is because if sales income is not recorded it is, of course, not just the VAT that is 
lost as a result but all the other taxes that may also be due as a result of that income 
being earned.  
 
The estimated rate of loss is higher than the average rate of tax due on UK GDP as a 
whole, which is just over 36% at present. This figure of 36% is estimated by 
comparing UK government tax income from the sources that this tax gap is likely to 
have impact upon (VAT, income tax, national insurance and corporation tax in 
particular) with total GDP.  
 
A higher rate than this for the purposes of tax loss estimation has been used for two 
reasons. The first is that in the case of unrecorded sales income the total tax lost is 
likely to be above the average tax rate. When the interaction of VAT, income tax and 
national insurance, in particular, is considered (and these are the most likely taxes not 
paid as a result of unrecorded sales income because such income is put in the pocket 
of the individual pockets of the self employed and company directors and so will rarely 
be subject to corporation tax but will instead be subject to personal taxation rates) 
then in practice combined charges will usually exceed 40%. In fact, up to 20% VAT 
and then income tax charged at a rate of at least 20% on the remaining net income 
plus national insurance at a potential combined rate of up to 25.8% can very easily 
exceed such a rate in combination and may in fact exceed 50% of unrecorded sales 
income, making this 40% estimate of loss on the low side, if anything. 
 
Secondly, this estimate of a loss of 40% is used because the unrecorded income in 
question is likely to be the top part of the income of those who are evading and 
because evidence shows that tax evasion is by no means the preserve of those on 
very low income in this country. Indeed, there is evidence that the shadow economy 
increases inequality in the UKix and that must mean those on higher income must 
benefit most. The estimate of tax lost is, therefore, based on that suggestion.  
 
The result is that this report accepts the estimate that £47 billion of tax may be lost in 
2014/15 as a result of the current size of the shadow economy in the UK. 
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6. Misrepresentation and carelessness in tax return 
reporting – data from HMRC‟s tax gap reports 
 
 
This report builds in part on research by Tax Research UK referred to in the preceding 
chapter. When undertaking that research Tax Research UK specifically assumed that 
three categories of tax loss, identified by HMRC as part of the tax gap, did not relate 
directly to the tax loss from the shadow economy. These three categories of loss 
identified by HMRC and not accounted for by Tax Research UK were: 
 
1. Tax lost due to criminal attacks on the tax system, stated to amount to £4.7 
billion in 2011/12x; 
2. £2.9 billion lost to errors in that year; 
3. £4.3 billion lost to failure to take reasonable care. 
 
Tax lost to criminal attacks was specifically excluded from the extrapolations used to 
estimate sales lost on unrecorded turnover in Tax Research UK‟s work and as such 
can be specifically considered to be part of the tax gap to be included in this report. 
HMRC‟s work on this issue is being accepted at face value on this issue and no 
further adjustment is being made. Much, but not all, of the loss will arise from VAT 
missing trader fraud.  
 
Neither is any adjustment needed to the figures supplied by HMRC for tax lost as a 
result of errors and failure to take reasonable care in the preparation of tax returns. 
These errors do not relate to the activities underlying the returns themselves, and so 
cannot be included in the tax lost due to unrecorded sales income. They do instead 
relate to errors with the tax return itself. As such this sum is also considered to be part 
of the additional tax gap suggested to arise by this report for three reasons. 
 
Firstly, we must presume that these errors are not tax avoidance activity or HMRC 
should have said so, and it has not. We must therefore presume them to be 
considered to be evasion by HMRC. 
 
Second, errors are defined by HMRC in their tax gap report to be the result of 
mistakes made in preparing tax calculations, completing returns or in supplying other 
relevant information, despite the HMRC customer (sic) taking reasonable care. This is 
therefore a loss clearly not covered by the other estimates of tax evasion included in 
this report. 
 
Thirdly, HMRC define failure to take reasonable care in the 2013 tax gap report as 
„being the result of customers‟ (sic) carelessness and/or negligence in adequately 
recording their transactions and/or in preparing their tax returns‟. Again, this is clearly 
very different from deliberately suppressing data on sales and is most likely to relate 
to another key part of tax evasion, and which is the focus of a great many tax 
enquiries, which is the inadvertent (or otherwise) claiming of expenses for offset 
against trading income by those in self employment and business. This issue is 
specifically not addressed by the Tax Research UK estimate of tax lost to the shadow 
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economy and so can, once again, be included as part of the tax evasion gap under 
consideration in this report.  
 
The total tax gap arising from these three causes in 2011-12 as noted by HMRC is  
£11.9 billion.  
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7. Criminality, fraud and tax evasion 
 
 
The National Fraud Authority Annual Fraud Indicator report for 2013xi provides very 
clear data on a wide range of non-trading illicit activity in the UK. The report benefits 
from considerable research, a clear indication of confidence factors relating to each 
type of fraud identified and unambiguous estimates. It does, therefore, provide a 
reference point for a major source of illicit income in the UK. That income, whether 
illicit or not, should be taxed in many cases. The estimate that follows is careful to 
consider only those areas where it is likely that a tax liability should arise and to also 
exclude the possibility of double counting activity that might have already been 
considered as part of the shadow economy. 
 
The National Fraud Authority (NFA) estimated that fraud against the public sector 
amounted to about £20.6 billion in 2012. Of this it was estimated that central 
government might be losing £2.6 billion and local government £2.1 billion to fraud, 
with a further £14.1 billion lost to tax fraud and vehicle excise fraud, and £1.9 billion to 
benefit and tax credit fraud. 
 
Clearly tax fraud cannot be counted twice and so the estimate of fraud in the public 
sector amounts to £6.5 billion for the purpose of this report, all of which could, and 
almost certainly should, be considered the taxable income of those undertaking the 
activity. Care has, however, to be taken to avoid double counting what might be 
considered business income already in the estimate of the shadow economy.  
 
In this regard, benefit fraud is clearly not undertaken in the course of a business. It is 
plausible, however, that some of the fraud against central and local government could 
be undertaken in the shadow economy. The total procurement and grant frauds 
identified by the National Fraud Authority have been excluded from consideration here 
for this reason as they may already be covered by estimates of tax lost to the shadow 
economy. They amount to £2.8 billion. The remaining fraud of £3.7 billion is 
considered likely to be income not already considered to be in the shadow economy 
on which tax might be evaded.  
 
The estimate the NFA has made of fraud against the UK private sector, excluding the 
financial services sector, suggests that fraud losses as a proportion of turnover for UK 
businesses could be in the region of 0.54 per cent, with 0.18 per cent lost to detected 
fraud and 0.36 per cent lost to hidden or undetected fraud. This is approximately 
equivalent to £15.9 billion per annum. This fraud represents illicit non-trading income 
for the recipients and does therefore contribute to the tax gap. The estimates appear 
to relate very largely to payment and banking fraud and accounting fraud. These are 
very unlikely to be part of the shadow economy. That said, the 21% of fraud relating to 
procurement may have already been considered as part of the shadow economy 
since companies are frequently used for false invoicing purposes and as such this part 
of the loss – or £3.3 billion - has been removed from the estimate to prevent the risk of 
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double counting. The remaining part of private sector fraud considered to contribute to 
the tax gap is, therefore, £12.6 billion. 
 
For the financial services sector the NFA has used Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) data for fraud relating to financial and insurance activities. 
The resulting combined estimate of fraud in this sector came to £5.4 billion in 2012. 
None of this appears to relate to matters likely to have already been included in 
estimates for the shadow economy.  
 
The NFA also identified £147 million of fraud against charities in 2012 and, more 
importantly, £9.1 billion of fraud against individuals. They suggested these frauds 
embrace „mass-marketing fraud, identity fraud, online ticket fraud, private rental 
property fraud and electricity prepayment meter scams‟. Whilst the figure for fraud 
against charities is highly unlikely to have been undertaken within the UK shadow 
economy the same cannot be said for the frauds perpetrated against individuals in the 
UK. Many of these may be undertaken by companies operating within the shadow 
economy. As such to avoid double counting this estimated loss has not been 
considered to contribute to the tax gap under the current heading to prevent the risk of 
double counting.  
 
In combination these frauds that are relevant for the purpose of consideration here 
and which would, if recorded, represent taxable income in the hands of those 
perpetrating them, would amount to approximately £21.8 billion in 2012. 
 
The tax due on this sum would not be as high as that due on trading income for two 
reasons. The first is that VAT is very unlikely to be due on it. The second is that if it is 
not treated as trading income nor is it likely that national insurance will be due. This 
therefore suggests that a somewhat lower rate of loss should be assumed for this 
category of tax evasion than is used or other activity in the shadow economy and as 
such a rate of loss of about 30% is presumed appropriate in this case, which is lower 
than the overall tax rate due in the UK noted previously. This loss does then primarily 
reflect missing income tax due. That would suggest that the tax loss arising in 2012 on 
this unrecorded income might be £6.5 billion.  
 
It should be noted that this does however assume that a significant part of this tax 
evasion will be by those who pay higher rates of income tax. There is evidence to 
support this view. Prof Colin Williams of Sheffield University, who has done much 
work in this area, has found that whilst the number of those on low incomes engaged 
in the shadow economy may be higher as a proportion of all earning similar sums than 
for those on higher levels of income, the activity remains commonplace amongst 
those on higher levels of income and that the sums they are involved in hiding are 
higherxii. He believes that tax fraud actually increases inequality in the UK as a result. 
Given the nature of much of the fraud referred to in this section it is likely to be 
undertaken by those already in employment with access to information on the 
organisations they defraud. In that case the sums defrauded will firstly constitute the 
top part of these people‟s income, increasing the chance that higher rates of income 
tax will be involved, aided by the fact that those involved are already likely to enjoy 
above average incomes.  
 Tax evasion in 2014   
  
 26 
 
The assumption made as to the tax rate likely, on average, to apply to the sum 
defrauded if it were to be subject to tax as income is, therefore, considered to be 
appropriate.  
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8. Tax evasion and UK rental income 
 
 
Undeclared rental income is part of the UK shadow economy referred to in chapter 4 
of this report. That has to be the case because VAT could be charged on rents but by 
government choice that does not happen. This does mean that undeclared rents are 
included in the £100 billion of unrecorded sales income likely to have arisen in the UK 
economy in 2011/12 to which that previous Tax Research UK research refers. That 
does not however, mean that this is not an area of interest when considering the 
causes of the UK tax gap and what might be done to address that issue. 
 
Estimating the tax lost as a result of undeclared rental income in the UK is not a 
straightforward task for a number of reasons. First of all, parliamentary questions on 
this issue have revealed how limited the data on those with rental income held by 
HMRC really is. For example, when asked about overseas landlords and their tax 
compliance by Jeremy Corbyn MP in April 2014 the response from The Exchequer 
secretary, David Gauke MP, was to the vast majority of questions that „The data 
requested … could be obtained only at a disproportionate cost‟xiii. As further evidence 
of this lack of data, a request under the Freedom of Information Act by a person 
unrelated to Tax Research UK or PCS in April 2014 asked the following question 
 
Could you please provide the number of people who have declared rental income 
from residential property over the past 5 years, broken down by year. And if 
possible, could you include a total figure for the number of properties as well? 
 
The response was that the total number of properties let out was not known because 
some tax returns did not require provision of this information; some individuals did not 
submit tax returns for rental income as that income was collected through the PAYE 
system (although how data was secured to achieve that goal is hard to imagine) and 
HMRC also had no idea which properties were let commercially and which were for 
habitation. They also had no idea how many people might be using the „rent a room‟ 
relief scheme. The obvious conclusion from this Freedom of Information response is 
that HMRC do not have sufficient data to form a reliable view of whether they are, or 
are not, collecting the tax due on properties let in the UK because they have no idea 
from the data they collect whether or not they are likely to have a complete population 
of properties covered by the tax returns submitted to them. 
 
This then makes this sector worthy of some attention to assess how much tax might 
be under-collected by HMRC as an example of a sector where better data would 
clearly help recovery of tax owing. 
 
HMRC estimated that the tax lost as a result of unrecorded letting income was £550 
million in 2010/11xiv.  
 
According to a report of the House of Commons Communities and Local Government 
Committee there were 3,843,000 private rented domestic properties in the UK in 
 Tax evasion in 2014   
  
 28 
2011-12xv. Evidence that there may as a result be undeclared rental income arising 
comes from the FoI response previously referred to in this section. HMRC suggested 
in that response that they knew of the addresses of 3,426,000 commercial and 
residential properties let during that year and that 134,000 other tax returns referred to 
rental income but they had no idea how many addresses might be involved. As they 
were simplified returns it may be assumed that the income in question was of limited 
amount and that the number of properties may be broadly equivalent to the number of 
returns made.  
 
How many of these declarations relating to letting were of commercial property 
appears not to be known by HMRC. It is curious though that Rightmove suggest in 
May 2014 that they have 40,000 commercial properties to let on their booksxvi and at 
the same time over 300,000 domestic properties to letxvii. Whilst it is undoubtedly true 
that buy-to-let housing is more attractive to many people than letting commercial 
property, it is quite untrue that individuals do not let commercial property. Using this, 
admittedly, basic (but probably quite comprehensive, given the significance of the 
Rightmove website in the UK property market) data the total number of commercial 
properties to let is about 12% of the total market. If one quarter of those were let by 
individuals (although by value the proportion is likely to be much lower) then perhaps 
115,000 commercial properties are let by individuals in the UK. Overall this would then 
suggest that, based on the data noted in the previous paragraph, rental income on 
maybe 400,000 properties a year is not being declared to HM Revenue & Customs. 
That number is likely to be rising given the significant growth in this sector. 
 
In 2011-12 the average rent on a UK domestic property was £674 a monthxviii. This 
would imply that the total value of rents in that year, using the figure of 3,843,000 let 
properties reported to parliament, was just over £31 billion. The amount of undeclared 
rental income might also amount, on that basis, to £3.2 billion. The figure is, by 
chance, a little over 10% of the total apparent income for the sector and so remarkably 
similar to the overall rate of loss noted for the shadow economy as a whole.  
 
The actual tax lost on this sum is almost impossible to estimate because the amount 
of expense capable of being offset is not known. In addition, the tax loss will already 
be included in the estimate for the tax gap resulting from the shadow economy already 
noted earlier in this report and so no additional figure can be included in the tax gap 
estimate made here. The message from this review is, however, an important one. 
Firstly, it is that a significant tax loss is likely in this sector and secondly HMRC are not 
collecting the data needed to verify the scale of the resulting tax gap on rental income. 
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9. UK investment income  
 
 
A source of income to UK taxpayers that is unlikely, at least at first glance, to be 
included in the estimate made of tax lost to the UK shadow economy is that arising on 
UK investment income.  
 
It may surprise many people that income from property, after the offset of expenses, is 
much smaller, for example, than income arising from dividends in the UK. In  2011–
12, which is the latest tax year for which data is available at the time of preparation of 
this report, the three main classes of investment income were summarised by HMRC 
as followsxix: 
 
Type of income Number declaring 
the source of 
income 
Total amount 
declared 
Mean declaration 
Income from 
property 
1,510,000 £12.1 bn £7,970 
Interest income 22,700,000 £7.4 bn £325 
Dividend income 4,530,000 £42.5 bn £9,380 
Other investment 
income 
1,110,000 £3.9 £3,600 
Total (per HMRC) 24,500,000 £65.9 bn £2,690 
 
Figure 5 
Source: HMRC, as noted 
 
Investment income is dominated by dividends but the number declaring such income 
is surprisingly low. According to HMRC‟s wealth statisticsxx (which are now, 
admittedly, becoming dated with the latest available only covering 2008 to 2010) 
5,123,000 people were likely to own shares in 2010 with those shares having a 
combined value of £469 billion. Despite this only 4.5 million declared income from 
dividends in 2011-12 according to HMRC. In contrast, HMRC wealth statistics 
suggested only 13.4 million people had significant holdings of cash and yet 22.7 
million declared interest income, suggesting they had at least some cash savings. 
Property data is not available for comparison.  
 
The differences within these contrasting data sources with regard to cash are fairly 
easily explained partly by the fact that wealth data is based on the declared property 
of those dying in a period, with that data then being extrapolated to the population as 
a whole, and small estates are excluded from wealth data because they do not need 
to be declared for inheritance tax purposes.  
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The data with regard to shares is more interesting. The simple disparity in data 
between the two sources does in the first instance suggest that maybe 600,000 
people may not be declaring dividend income for tax purposes.  
 
Secondly, the rate of income declared by those including dividend income on their tax 
returns compared to asset value is very high. It reflects an apparent rate of 9% per 
annum. The overall rate of return expected on the London Stock Exchange has, 
however, in recent years averaged around 3 per cent per annum. What this then 
suggests is that a significant part, that may be as high as approximately £28 billion, of 
the dividends declared on tax returns are not the result of returns on quoted 
investments but are likely to represent dividends paid in lieu of salaries by the 
director/shareholders of small privately owned companies. Those companies do, 
however, have little or no value attributed to them for estate valuation purposes, firstly 
because they usually have no such worth by the time of the death of their owner 
because they have retired by then; secondly because the worth is actually all tied up 
with the goodwill that actually attaches to the owner and this disappears on death and 
thirdly because these shares are usually subject to inheritance tax exemptions 
meaning that this tax is not paid on them.  
 
There are a number of other issues to draw out though. 600,000 missing shareholders 
happens to match in number the highest estimate made by Tax Research UK of the 
number of shadow companies likely to be operating in the UK economy, although a 
more cautious 400,000 total was adopted for final estimation purposes in their May 
2014 report on the shadow economy. It is possible that these numbers may overlap. 
In that case if 600,000 people are under-declaring income this would suggest at least 
£5.6 billion of undeclared dividends on tax returns. Any resulting tax is, however, likely 
to already be included in Tax Research UK‟s estimate of tax lost to the shadow 
economy and it not therefore additionally included in any estimate of the tax gap made 
here, but the evidence is, yet again, of significant under-declaration. 
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10. UK capital gains 
 
 
Separate tax gap data was not published for capital gains tax in 2013: the loss is 
aggregated with that for income tax and national insurance. This may reflect the fact 
that UK capital gains tax payments are small at just £3.9 billion in 2012-13, which is 
the last year for which confirmed data is available. The yield is, however, forecast to 
increase dramatically, with the budget for 2014 suggesting a yield of £9 billion might 
be received by 2018-19xxi. In 2012 the tax gap loss was stated to be £130 millionxxii.  
 
It is hard to see on what basis such an optimistic forecast of future yield (or of past 
loss, come to that) is based. HMRC‟s capital gains statistics are, like much HMRC 
data, only available up to 2012-13 at the time of writing, in which year just 146,000 
people declared gainsxxiii. The total number of people declaring gains has never 
exceeded 250,000 in a year, which was in tax year 2007-08. Trusts declaring gains 
added modest numbers to the totals in each year. 
 
When compared with the 4.5 million people declaring dividend income and 5.1 million 
people believed to own shares in the UK according to HMRC wealth statistics, both 
noted in the previous section, the numbers declaring capital gains seem incredibly 
small, especially given the estimated £469 billion worth of share holdings within UK 
estates according to HMRCxxiv and the 3.8 million rental properties in the UK, all of 
which are owned, at least in part, to secure capital gains. 
 
In April 2014 the UK stock market was worth £2,227 billionxxv.  HMRC‟s wealth data, 
whilst out of date, suggests that UK individuals own shares representing more than 
20% of this exchange by value (although some shares they held may not have been 
quoted, of course and some quoted investments may be held elsewhere, but without 
that fact having significant likely impact on the estimates that follow). Trading data 
from the same exchangexxvi suggests that in April 2014 there were about 8.5 million 
trades in FTSE 100 shares that month. That means there are likely to be about 100 
million trades a year. It is not for a moment suggested that 20% of these trades were 
by UK individuals; the vast majority were, of course, by professional traders. However, 
given that volume of trading and the fact that, as already noted, a significant 
proportion of the FTSE 100 is owned by UK resident individuals, it is very hard to 
believe that fewer than 200,000 UK individuals really made capital gains requiring 
declaration to HMRC in a single tax year. 
 
This doubt leads to the suspicion that there is significant under-declaration of capital 
gains tax liabilities in the UK, a feeling that is compounded by data on house sales. 
932,000 UK residential property transactions were completed in the UK in 2012 
according to HMRCxxvii. Data published by the House of Commons Communities and 
Local Government Committee already noted in this reportxxviii suggests that in 2011-12 
3,843,000 households were located in private rented accommodation in the UK and 
14,388,000 were owner-occupiers. That means that it is likely that of all UK properties 
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21% may be owned for buy-to-let purposes and in that case maybe 196,000 of the 
property transactions in 2012 might have related to properties owned for buy to let 
purposes and yet in 2009-10, the last year for which data is available, just 52,000 
residential property sales were reported for capital gains tax purposes. 
This was, admittedly, a period of fluctuating fortunes in the property market but 
property gains need to be reported whether or not a profit arises: indeed, there is an 
incentive to declare losses as they can be used for offset against other gains.  
 
The inevitable conclusion of this review of both share and property transactions is that 
capital gains tax is a tax where under-declaration of transactions and resulting tax 
liabilities is likely to be rife. It is entirely reasonable to believe, based on this evidence, 
that at most 50 per cent of the transactions resulting in a capital gain requiring 
declaration to UK tax authorities may actually be disclosed on UK tax returns by those 
liable to pay this tax. Whilst any estimate of tax lost as a consequence is inevitably 
just that, i.e. an estimate, there is good reason for the reasons noted to think the loss 
might well be as high as the amount of tax currently actually declared as payable. An 
estimated loss of £3.9 billion in 2012-13 has therefore been added to the total tax gap 
estimate made by this report for this reason. 
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11. Tax evasion and Inheritance tax 
 
 
Inheritance tax is the only tax that we have in the UK that approximates to a wealth 
tax. With the exception of some special charges on trusts it can only be charged on 
death or gifts in the period before death. According to HMRC‟s latest statistics on the 
issue, to which most of the data in this section refersxxix, inheritance tax declarations 
are required from only just over half of all the estates of those who die in the UK each 
year; the other estates being either too small for a declaration to be required (this 
happening when they are worth less than £5,000) or because the entire property 
moves to a surviving spouse, in which case no declaration is needed. Of those 
260,000 or so estates where declaration was required in 2010-11 tax was only due in 
a very small number of cases. Just 3% of all estates – or about 16,000 estates, paid 
inheritance tax in that year. 
 
There are good reasons for this very low rate of payment. Firstly, the inheritance tax 
allowance permits £325,000 worth of assets to be given away on death or in the 
seven years preceding it without any tax charge arising.  
 
Secondly, all gifts that a person can make out of their income which do not impact 
upon their lifestyle are, by definition, tax-free for inheritance tax purposes because 
they are not made out of their accumulated wealth, which is what this tax is 
supposedly charged on. This, very obviously, has enormous value to the very wealthy 
who enjoy large incomes as they can give very large sums away using this loophole.  
 
In addition there are a large number of exemptions and reliefs for inheritance tax 
which means that the vast majority of small businesses, farms, timber, and even 
investment in some shares on the London Stock Exchange are all likely to fall outside 
the scope of the tax.  
 
And then there is the domicile rule, which means that the estates of those not 
domiciled or deemed to be domiciled in the UK for the purposes of this tax do, to the 
extent that they are located outside the UK, fall outside the scope of inheritance tax. 
This is another enormous loophole in this tax, aided and abetted by the fact that it is 
easy for non-domiciled people to set up offshore tax arrangements to hide the 
ownership of their assets and that they do not have to declare their offshore income to 
HMRC on their tax returns, giving no clue, therefore, as to whether or not such assets 
exist. 
 
There is, however, another dimension to inheritance tax to which the government 
makes no mention in its statistics, which is the fact that this tax is paid in no small part 
by those who, through good conscience, choose to declare the liability owing. This is a 
particular problem with regard to this tax for three reasons: 
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a. It is relatively easy to hide the ownership of many assets, including companies 
and even homes. Fraud with regard to ownership is incredibly easy to arrange 
and relatively hard to detect, especially given the lack of resources in HMRC to 
undertake this activity. The UK government has acknowledged this by deciding 
that disclosure of the beneficial ownership of companies is now a priority issue 
if fraud is to be prevented.  
 
b. Gifts made in the seven years before death are all potentially chargeable to 
inheritance tax but are, again, very hard to detect unless those in receipt of 
them are honest at the time of death, and it is likely that many will not be 
inclined to be so. Once more, a lack of resources at HMRC aids those 
committing this fraud to get away with their crime (for that is what it is).  
 
c. Valuation of assets is often subjective and open to misreporting, by no means 
all of which will be detected, especially when HMRC is under-resourced. 
 
For all these reasons it has been widely assumed that inheritance tax is open to 
abuse, but estimating the scale of evasion has been difficult. HMRC put it at just £0.4 
billion in their 2013 tax gap reportxxx, which is still significant when inheritance tax paid 
in the year to which that relates (2011/12) was only £2.9 bnxxxi. 
 
The publication of new wealth data by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in May 
2014 has helped overcome this estimation problem to some degree. It provides 
information in four categories, being financial assets, property assets, personal 
property (in other words, individual‟s possessions) and pension assetsxxxii. The last 
can be ignored for inheritance tax purposes; by definition they usually cease to have 
value on death and cannot normally be subject to an inheritance tax charge as a 
result.  
 
Data for all these categories is available from the ONS for 2008 to 2010, which 
happens to be the period for which HM Revenue & Customs has most recently 
published data on what it estimates total personal wealth to be. These HMRC 
estimates are based on declarations made in estates subject to inheritance tax (but for 
which purpose they also give consideration to those estates that do not need to be 
declared for the purposes of that tax)xxxiii. The comparisons are surprising: 
 
Type of asset ONS estimate 
£’bn 
HMRC estimate 
£’bn 
Difference 
£’bn 
Land, building and 
houses 
3,379 1,837 1,542 
All financial assets 1,091 1,683 -592 
Sub-total 4,470 3,520 950 
Personal property 1,016 n/a 1,016 
Total 5,486 3,520 1,966 
 
Figure 6 
Source, ONS and HMRC as noted 
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Considering just land, buildings, houses and financial assets the ONS thought that UK 
personal wealth was £950 billion greater than that estimated by HMRC. It is stressed 
that all assets are stated net of associated liabilities, so the value of land and buildings 
is net of mortgages and financial assets are stated net of non-property related loans.  
 
Perversely, HMRC does not provide an estimate for the value of personal assets 
included in estates. It is not clear why: very clearly the value is significant.  
 
HMRC do, on the other hand, admit that the value of some property moving through 
estates may be omitted by them, either because it is exempt for the purposes of the 
tax (for reasons noted above) or because it passes straight to spouses. However, the 
latter should not distort issues significantly: spouses also die in due course and then 
the whole estate should be valued. Overall this should balance out in HMRC‟s 
estimates. 
 
What is clear is that, however viewed, the difference between these estimates is 
significant. To be cautious, it is unwise to assume that all the difference between 
these sums represents value on which inheritance tax might be evaded. That said, if 
the ONS estimates are right then there are three significant issues to initially consider. 
The first is to consider what part of the total gap may be taxable. Second, how much 
of that difference may become liable to inheritance tax each year has to be 
considered, because very clearly not all will and thirdly, the rate of tax that might be 
due is a matter of concern. 
 
There is no way of knowing for sure what proportion of the total gap between these 
two valuations may be liable to inheritance tax. It is only appropriate to be candid 
about that. What is certain is that some is not, but not always for the reasons that 
many might suggest. For example, this valuation difference is not because of the 
domicile rule: it is unlikely that the non-UK based assets of non-domiciled people will 
be included in either of these estimates, and so they can be ignored for this purpose.  
 
It is also very clear that some domestic property will not be in HMRC‟s estimate 
because this is one of the easiest assets that can be passed on a first death in a 
relationship between spouses, but it would seem very unlikely that this is the whole 
explanation in the estimation differences: these properties are likely to eventually pass 
on death and so should for that reason be included in the HMRC estimate.  
 
Part of this difference must therefore be because assets are being transferred in ways 
intended to evade and not just avoid inheritance tax whilst valuation under-
declarations may also be an issue with regard to these properties. There may also be 
differing methods of allocating loan liabilities between the two estimates: this is one of 
the most likely reasons for some of the stark differences noted. For that reason 
considering differences in aggregate seems the most useful way of accounting for this 
information. 
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In that case estimates have to be made based on a valuation difference relating to 
assets that might potentially be subject to inheritance tax of almost £2 trillion 
(£2,000,000,000,000, which is a sum bigger than the total annual income of the UK). 
Such estimates have, inevitably, to be more akin to the application of rules of thumb 
than to be precise, formulaic allocations. So, for example, HMRC say that half of all 
estates are not subject to inheritance tax. In that case, whilst it seems likely that the 
new and additional top part of wealth that the ONS would appear to have revealed 
would be subject to inheritance tax for reasons of caution alone it may be appropriate 
to presume that half of that additional sum might not be subject to that tax even if this 
is contrary to apparent logic. 
 
Even when this logic is applied, for the reasons also noted above, there will be assets 
that will fall out of the scope of inheritance tax because of its generous exemptions. 
Again, it is not possible to provide a precise answer to how much might be involved 
and so another rule of thumb has to be applied. In the absence of detailed data 
another 50% reduction (of the already reduced sum, or 25% of the whole) is assumed 
appropriate for this purpose in this report. This is likely to be fair: HMRC say all 
exemptions of this sort reduced tax bills by £1.3 billion in 2013/14xxxiv, when £3.5 
billion in tax was paid.  
 
Even after these two „discounts‟ on the gap between the ONS and HMRC wealth 
estimates there remain almost £500 billion of assets that may not be included in 
inheritance tax declarations on which that tax may be due. That value would not, of 
course, all fall to be taxed in one year. Estates largely pass on death. Two obvious 
points need to be noted on this. The first is that most people die in older age and 
secondly that most wealth is owned by older people, As the ONS has noted, the 
highest average wealth is held by couple households without children, where one 
person is over and the other under the state pension age and the next highest was for 
couple households where both adults were over the state pension age with no 
childrenxxxv.  
 
In that case it has been assumed that at least one thirtieth of the annual stock of the 
remaining difference in value (or about £500 billion) might become subject to 
inheritance tax a year at a rate of 40%. That means £6.6 billion of additional 
inheritance tax might be due annually as a result. This sum has been added to the 
estimates for the tax gap in this report.  
 
It should be highlighted that this estimate does suggest that more inheritance tax is 
evaded than is paid in the UK. This is considered entirely plausible given, firstly, the 
very low rate of payment and secondly the ease with which this tax can be evaded 
and thirdly the evidence from available data on wealth in the UK.  
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12. Offshore tax evasion 
 
 
The problem of offshore tax evasion has been a recurring theme for those 
campaigning for tax justice. It is a cause of much dispute as a consequence of those 
who use and abuse tax havens and offshore accounts having fought back against 
allegations made against them, saying all they do in these places is legal. 
Unfortunately they have not been willing to open their tax haven books to prove that 
point. 
 
The vast majority of the estimates of the tax lost to tax haven abuse now available 
have arisen as a result of the work of NGOs and civil society organisations, many of 
them based in the UK. The Tax Justice Network is one of these organisations and its 
2012 report „The Price of Offshore Revisited‟xxxvi is a comprehensive report with a 
broad evidence base. It has been used as the basis for estimates of tax lost to 
offshore tax evasion in this report. This Tax Justice Network report has been widely 
reported worldwide and has been cited many times, although not everyone (and most 
especially those offshore) agrees with itxxxvii despite the fact that it uses four different 
bases for estimating the data it reports, including data supplied by the major banks 
who dominate the offshore wealth management market.  
 
It should be noted that using this third party data on tax lost to offshore activity is 
appropriate because, as the IMF said when it appraised HMRC‟s tax gap methodology 
in 2013xxxviii, the HMRC estimate of the tax gap was most likely to omit foreign sources 
of income that individuals enjoy, such as that from tax havens. Evidence of this 
oversight on HMRC‟s part is readily available: the words „offshore and „tax haven‟ 
cannot be found in HMRC‟s 2013 tax gap reportxxxix.  
 
The Tax Justice Network report suggests that there was a minimum of US$21 trillion 
illicitly held offshore in 2010. The number may have been as high as $32 trillion, but 
the lower figure is used here for the sake of caution. It is stressed that this is not the 
total sum held offshore; it is the part likely to be held offshore for the purposes of 
evading tax liabilities.  
 
For the sake of the estimate of tax lost to the UK resulting from this estimate of hidden 
offshore wealth a number of assumptions have to be made. The first is that this stock 
of wealth resulted in income that should have been subject to tax earned at the rate of 
3 per cent per annum. This is very cautious. The current dividend yield on the FTSE 
100 is, for example, 3.26 per centxl. This rate of return also ignores all capital 
accumulation despite this capital accumulation being significant: in 2012 the BBC 
noted that the wealth of the UK‟s richest 1,000 people had apparently grown by 4.7 
per cent in the previous yearxli. Any tax loss on that growth is ignored in this report. 
Despite that the total income earned on US$21 trillion would, on the basis of a 3 per 
cent per annum rate of return, be US$630 billion in a year. If translated to sterling at 
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the rate of £1 being equivalent to US$1.58 (which is fair over the entire period under 
reviewxlii) this would amount to £399 billion a year. 
 
It is then assumed for UK estimation purposes that tax would only be due at 20% on 
this sum. This is because it is possible that these assets may, if they had been held in 
this country, have been sheltered in UK companies instead of being held in the names 
of individuals. The potential worldwide tax lost is, on that basis, when rounded to the 
nearest billion, £80 billion a year.  
 
To then work out what part of this might actually be lost to the UK an estimate of the 
proportion of likely world wealth owned by UK resident people is required. This is 
complicated by the fact that some of the wealthy living in the UK are not domiciled in 
this country and so do not pay tax on their worldwide income in the UK (which is an 
undoubted part of the attraction to them for living here). As such reports that the UK 
has more billionaires living here than anywhere else have to be dismissed for this 
purposexliii. Instead data from an organisation called WealthInsightxliv, quoted in the 
Guardian newspaper in 2013xlv, has been used instead because it considers the 
distribution of US dollar millionaires, which is a wealth level where the domicile rule is 
likely to have a much lower impact on tax liabilities. This source suggested the 
following distribution of US dollar millionaires in 2012:  
 
Rank Country 
Number of 
Millionaires 
1 US 5,231,000 
2 Japan 2,105,000 
3 Germany 1,326,000 
4 China 1,280,000 
5 UK 675,000 
6 France 555,000 
7 Canada 422,000 
8 Switzerland 298,000 
9 Australia 275,000 
10 Italy 259,000 
Total 
 
12,426,000 
 
Figure 7 
Source: WealthInsight, as noted 
 
On the basis of this data the UK has 5.4% of the top ten countries‟ millionaires, or 
675,000 dollar millionaires in all. This estimate does, admittedly, ignore the fact that 
the data used is not a sample of all millionaires but given the incredibly cautious 
estimates made on income yield, tax rate and wealth returns, this is considered a fair 
compensatory estimate of the total potential share of hidden income attributable to UK 
taxable people.  
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In that case it is estimated that offshore tax evasion might cost the UK £4.3 billion a 
year in lost tax revenue.  
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13. Summarising the tax evasion gap in the UK 
 
Having explored all these issues relating to tax evasion in the UK some conclusions 
on the total loss arising from tax evasion in the UK on a year-by-year basis can be 
drawn. 
 
A summary of the data referred to in this report is as follows. It excludes the data 
discussed for tax evasion on investment and rental income to minimise the risk of 
double counting: 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Source: This report, as noted 
 
Data is extrapolated from 2011/12, for which most was calculated (excluding capital 
gains tax, taken from a 2012/13 base), on the basis of the growth in GDP since then, 
excluding data for the shadow economy where the forecast size of the VAT gap 
reported in the autumn statement of 2013 is also taken into account. GDP forecasts 
are based on the March 2014 budgetxlvi.  
 
The total tax evasion gap looks like this: 
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Figure 9 
Source: Figure 8 
 
From a figure of just over £70 billion in 2011/12 tax evasion is likely to have a total 
cost of £85 billion in 2014/15 and could cost over £100 billion to the Exchequer by 
2018/19. 
 
To set this figure in context a summary of forecast UK government spending in 
2014/15 is as follows: 
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Figure 10 
Source: 2014 Budget, HM Treasury and as noted 
 
What would £85 billion pay for? Total government spending on personal social 
services, housing and the environment, the department for industry, agriculture, 
employment and half of government spending on transport could be paid for in 2014 
with that sum. That‟s how important the tax evasion gap is. 
 
Alternatively it would pay for most of the UK education budget or 60% of all spending 
on the NHS.   
 
If used in a different way, eliminating tax evasion would also eliminate the whole of the 
2014/15 budget deficit and leave £1 billion over to spend. There would be no 
remaining arguments left for austerity.  
 
In practice it has, of course, to be accepted that it is very unlikely that the entire tax 
evasion gap can ever be closed but the goal has to be there, and a proper appraisal of 
the problem, as provided in this report, makes clear how big the rewards for effective 
action might be. 
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14. The rest of the tax gap: tax avoidance 
 
As noted in chapter 2 of this report, the UK‟s tax gap is made up of three parts. The 
first, which is the main focus of this report, is tax evasion.  
 
The second part of the tax gap is unpaid tax debt, which is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
 
The third part is tax avoidance, which is the activity undertaken by those people and 
companies who seek to get round the law without actually breaking it to artificially 
reduce their tax bill in a way that Parliament never intended.  
 
Tax avoidance has attracted a great deal of attention in the media since about 2011 
when the stories of tax avoidance by Google, Vodafone, Amazon, Starbucks, Apple 
and other companies began to make headline news. The use of highly contrived tax 
avoidance schemes by high-profile media personalities, including Gary Barlow, Chris 
Moyles, Jimmy Carr and others, has also attracted much attention. The reality is, 
however, that tax avoidance has always been a much smaller part of the UK's tax gap 
than tax evasion. 
 
In the PCS report on the tax gap in 2010 reliance was placed on the TUC‟s 2008 
estimate of total UK tax avoidancexlvii, also prepared by Richard Murphy of Tax 
Research UK.  That report estimated that total tax avoidance at that time amounted to 
£13 billion per annum by individuals and £12 billion per annum by large companies 
based in the UK, or £25 billion in all. 
 
There has, unfortunately, been no further report on the scale of tax avoidance in the 
UK prepared by anyone outside HMRC since 2008. Estimating the currents scale of 
tax avoidance is, therefore, more problematic than estimating the current scale of tax 
evasion, given the resources available for the preparation of this report. There are 
however some clear indicators that are available. 
 
Firstly, HMRC admit that there are real problems with tax avoidance. Their most 
recent tax gap report, referring to the 2011-12 tax year, suggests that tax avoidance 
represented a loss of £4 billion within the total tax gap. They also suggested that 
disputes on legal interpretation gave raise to another £4.3 billion of loss during that 
year. It is very hard to see how a dispute concerning legal interpretation can be 
differentiated from tax avoidance activity when both are clearly about not paying tax in 
ways that HMRC think Parliament did not intend and as such the combined total of 
these figures, or £8.3 billion, is the starting point for estimating tax avoidance in this 
report. 
 
It is very obvious that these estimates of tax avoidance are understated. The most 
obvious evidence of that fact comes from evidence given by HMRC to the Public 
Accounts Committee in which they make clear that HMRC tax gap estimates do not 
include sums that the media have suggested are avoided by companies like Google 
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and Amazon, for which claims the PAC found much supporting evidencexlviii. This is 
significant: in 2012 the Mail on Sunday, using methodology pioneered by Richard 
Murphy of Tax Research UK, estimated that just five US based internet companies 
underpaid UK corporation tax by at least £660 million in 2011. Clearly they are not 
alone in undertaking sales activity from outside the UK which gives rise to these 
losses. It is likely that as a result well over £1 billion is lost to tax avoidance for this 
reason on top of that already admitted to by HMRC. This is likely to bring the overall 
estimate of tax lost by HMRC as a result of tax avoidance to more than £10 billion, 
even making cautious estimates as to likely sales growth by these companies since 
2011 and that companies like Facebook and Twitter have grown considerably since 
then and operate in broadly similar style to Google.  
 
There is also good reason for thinking that the abuse of tax havens by large 
companies remains significant, and this would not be picked up by HMRC‟s estimates 
either since they consider much of such use legitimate. For example, in June 2014 
Barclays plc published its first country-by-country report on the location of its profits 
and tax paidxlix. What this showed was that Barclays made profits of £2,868 million 
pounds in that year (£2.9 billion). However, of this sum £2,181 million (£2.2 billion) 
was declared in Luxembourg and Jersey and a loss of £1,339 million (£1.3 billion) was 
declared in the UK.  
 
Despite this a total of £830 million of corporation tax was paid by Barclays in 2013, 
including £55 million in the UK, but there are major issues in appraising the validity of 
this tax paid data, which does not directly relate to the profit figures Barclays‟ declared 
because tax is generally paid some time after profits are earned. Even taking this 
factor into account, work undertaken by Tax Research UK has shown that if Barclays‟ 
total group profits were split in proportion to where its staff are located and where its 
sales are made then it would have been reasonable to expect Barclays to have 
declared profits in the UK of about £1.1 billion in 2013 with tax due as a result of, 
maybe, £250 million instead of the £55 million actually paidl.  
 
These figures are, of course, estimates, but they do suggest that tax avoidance 
activity that shifts where profits are recorded is seriously undermining the UK tax base 
in a way that is not reflected in HMRC‟s tax gap estimate. If an underestimate of 
maybe £200 million might arise with regard to just one company as a consequence 
then it is entirely plausible that at least £2 billion of such loss might arise overall 
amongst large companies.  This estimate, when combined with the previous 
estimates, suggest that losses to tax avoidance might be at least £12 billion a year. 
 
The TUC estimate made in 2008 included estimated losses from a number of other 
sources. These included losses of national insurance resulting from small companies 
substituting dividend payments to their owners in place of salaries, so avoiding both 
employees and employers national insurance charges, and losses as a result of the 
use of the domicile rule by people resident in the UK who did not pay tax on their 
worldwide income because of their having a domicile outside this country. It was also 
estimated that a significant loss of tax arose as a consequence of shifting income 
between spouses, partners, and other family members, mainly through self-
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employment but also to exploit capital gains tax loopholes and to save tax on 
investment income. 
 
There are a number of difficulties in repeating these estimates at this time. Firstly, 
incentives to shift capital gains tax liabilities to save tax have been reduced because 
of reductions in capital gains tax rates from 2009/10 onwards. Secondly, whilst the 
payment of dividends from small companies to their owners, and income shifting by 
this route, was considered a matter of major concern to HM RC until 2008, it has since 
subsequently largely fallen off the tax avoidance agenda that HMRC wish to pursue, 
with an apparent tolerance of this activity now existing within the UK tax system. 
Thirdly, arrangements with regard to application of the domicile rule have changed 
since 2008, with the availability of access to this rule being more restricted now and 
the apparent number of people making use of it appearing to have fallen as a 
consequence. Lastly, and quite importantly, data in some of these areas is now harder 
to obtain. 
 
The consequence is that estimates of this type of tax avoidance are more difficult to 
secure than they were in 2008, and further work is needed to update estimates before 
any reliable figures can be given.  
 
It is also unwise to presume that figures published for the costs of various tax 
avoidance schemes that have been tackled by HMRC relate to any one particular tax 
year, and therefore extrapolation of them is hard.  
 
In addition there can be no doubt that HMRC have been quite successful in the last 
two or three years in tackling some aspects of personal tax avoidance, not least by 
publicising the names of high-profile users of prepackaged tax avoidance schemes 
meaning that the likelihood of such schemes now being sold to the extent that existed 
when previous estimates were made is reduced.  
 
As a consequence of all these measures it is possible that personal tax avoidance is 
lower now than it has been in the past. Such activity has not, however, ceased. The 
domicile rule continues to be widely used by some parts of the UK community and 
whilst HMRC and the government continue to deny this represents tax avoidance, any 
arrangement that allows some people resident in the UK to pay less tax by pure 
accident of their birth (which is, in effect, what the domicile rule does) cannot be 
considered part of normal tax arrangements, and it is not so in almost any other 
country bar the UK. As such even if the scale of this activity has been reduced by the 
charges introduced in 2008 (and that is possible) the use of these rules does 
undoubtedly continue, especially on the part of those living temporarily in the UK. The 
estimate made by the TUC in 2008 of the loss from the domicile rule was £3.8 billion a 
year. It would be safe to assume that it remains at least £2 billion a year now. 
 
National insurance planning through the use of small companies remains 
commonplace, and the number of small companies has grown since 2008. There 
were 2,686,000 in March 2008, a number that has now increased to 3,290,000li. 
Anecdotally there has been no change in the prevalence of this activity since 2008 
and so whilst HMRC do not consider this issue the priority that it was previously 
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considered to be there is no reason to remove it from estimates of tax avoidance. 
Updating the 2008 estimate simply for the increase in the number of companies in the 
meantime suggests that a current estimate of this sum avoided might now amount to 
£2.2 billion a year. This may be conservative: national insurance rates have increased 
over this period and no allowance has been made for this.  
 
There then remain other areas where tax avoidance exists but is not likely to be 
recognised within the HMRC estimates, this being necessary to avoid any risk of 
double counting. An area where this is likely is with regard to stamp duty on 
commercial property. Whilst extensive measures have been taken by the government 
to tackle stamp duty abuse in the UK domestic housing market as a result of the 
registration of the ownership of these properties in offshore tax havens there has been 
no equivalent attack on the use of either onshore or offshore structures when used for 
the ownership of commercial properties.  
 
Anecdotally there is considerable evidence of the use of corporate (but not necessarily 
offshore) structures for this purpose with a large number of commercial properties 
being owned through companies so that on second sale of the property the shares in 
the company that owns the property are sold rather than selling the property itself. 
This means that stamp duty land tax (SDLT) of up to 4% can be avoided. 
 
There are, of course, more influences on the SDLT receipts that HMRC enjoys than 
tax avoidance. There has obviously been a major property crisis linked to the financial 
crisis over the period since 2005 for which HMRC publish data on commercial 
property transactions for SDLT purposes. However, some trends in the data are very 
obvious.  Whilst the overall number of chargeable transactions worth more than 
£40,000 has both grown and declined in line with likely expected market trends based 
on the state of the economy in the last decade, there are different trends at the top 
end of the scale relating to transactions involving commercial property worth more 
than £2 million. Here it seems from the evidence of building work in some parts of the 
country that there is considerable activity in the commercial property market but 
despite this the number of transactions has not recovered to its 2007 quantity of 8,000 
deals in a year (there were 6,000 in 2013) but the average value at this higher end of 
the market has remained remarkably static at about £11.3 million a deal.lii If the 
missing deals are now taking place through the sale of shares in companies, 
chargeable to stamp duty at 0.5% at most – and given the recovery in apparent 
property activity this appears plausible – at least £790 million of SDLT would be lost in 
this transaction bracket alone.  
 
There are also other likely losses to tax avoidance in the property sector. In August 
2014 the Financial Times reportedliii that at least £122bn of property in England and 
Wales was held through companies in offshore tax havens where ownership is difficult 
to trace. It noted that nearly two out of three of the 91,248 foreign-company owned 
properties in England and Wales are held via the British Virgin Islands and Channel 
Island structures. A breakdown between residential and commercial property was not 
available according to the Financial Times but it added that in practice the total value 
of offshore ownership is likely to be considerably higher than £122bn because more 
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than a third of the data provided by the Land Registry did not contain a purchase 
price. 
 
The Financial Times did not estimate the cost of the tax avoidance resulting from 
these structures but at least three taxes are potentially being avoided. They are stamp 
duty, inheritance tax and capital gains tax. A fourth could be income tax if the 
properties in question are being let and are artificially loaded with debt to avoid 
payment, but that issue is ignored here.  
 
To estimate the tax lost a number of assumptions have to be made. First, it is highly 
likely that there is „churn‟ in the ownership of the portfolio of at least 91,000 properties 
to which this data refers. It would be very surprising if average ownership periods 
exceeded 10 years given the nature of the ownership, the fact that they have almost 
certainly been put in offshore ownership to avoid stamp duty on sale and the nature of 
this market.  
 
This activity has now gone on for some time. Because most of the properties are in 
Greater London they are likely (but not certain) to be residential. The average property 
is worth at least £1.3 million, and probably rather more by now since this will be 
historic data. Assuming that prices have not inflated but that property is domestic, a 
5% stamp duty rate would be appropriate. If 9,100 properties changed hands a year 
that is at least £610 million of stamp duty avoided, and probably somewhat more due 
to price increases over time not allowed for in this calculation. If average prices have 
inflated since purchase as noted below when looking at capital gains tax it is likely the 
loss might be £900 million a year. The lower estimate is used here. 
 
The next potential loss is to avoided inheritance tax. One of the attractions of holding 
property offshore as opposed to through a UK company (which is, of course, possible 
to avoid stamp duty on transfer) is that for the non-domiciled person this avoids 
inheritance tax on an asset located in the UK. The question that has to be asked in 
that case is how many of the owners of these properties die a year?  
 
It has already been assumed in this report that 1/30 of all wealth might be subject to 
an inheritance tax charge in any year but in this group wealth may be more widely 
dispersed than normal. In that case a rate of 1/40 of all property being subject to 
inheritance tax could be a more appropriate estimate. In that case about £3 billion of 
property may miss a charge at a rate of 40% a year. That is £1.2 billion avoided per 
annum. 
 
And then there is capital gains tax. If a ten-year ownership period of residential 
property in London is assumed and this is prime central London housing, then estate 
agents John D Wood suggest that London prices have almost exactly doubled from 
March 2004 to March 2014liv. That means that if property that cost £12.2 billion is sold 
each year a gain is bound to arise. On the basis of the assumptions used, if property 
is sold after ten years of ownership and the portfolio reflects cost price incurred over 
that ten year time interval then the average price of the portfolio is that of property 
bought five years before sale. Using the John D Wood data this might cautiously 
suggest that the average gain realised was about 50% of cost price. This would 
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suggest that the average gain on the portfolio that is likely to be sold in any year is 
about 50% of about £12.2 billion, or about £6.1 billion in this case. 
 
Not all this sum would, however,  be subject to CGT: some (but not all) of these 
properties will be subject to principal private residence relief, and some will be let. 
Assuming just one third are subject to CGT, and that seems fair given these two 
factors, that would leave gains avoided on a little over £2 billion that might have been 
payable at 28% if recorded in the personal names of their UK resident owners. That is 
£510 million of CGT avoided. 
 
This leaves £2.3 billion of tax avoided in all a year as a result of this offshore 
ownership of UK property. In that case it is not surprising that there has been a 
surprising willingness amongst owners of these properties to pay the new „envelope‟ 
tax charge introduced by George Osborne that has yielded much more than 
expected, with over £200 million expected to be paid this yearlv.  The avoidance 
activity still pays handsomely with a likely net return of  about £2.1 billion a year.  
 
Taking just these noted factors into account total tax avoidance is likely to be at least 
£19.1 billion a year based on these cautious estimates. The figure is lower than noted 
in 2008, a fact that reflects declining corporation tax rates (which reduces the yield 
from avoidance), declining capital gains tax rates (which have the same impact), a 
likely decline in non-domicile activity as a result of legislative changes and caution 
being made in other estimates but the sum remains of considerable concern, and 
much higher than HMRC suggest in their own tax gap estimates despite the fact that 
some of these issues, such as national insurance avoidance, have been major issues 
of concern to them in the past.  
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15. The rest of the tax gap: tax debt 
 
The third component of the tax gap is tax debt. 
 
There are two ways of measuring tax debt. One is the total amount of overdue debt at 
any point of time and the other is the amount of tax debt written off in a year. In the 
2010 PCS tax gap estimate the amount of tax debt at a point in time was used as the 
relevant estimate. At that time HMRC estimated this sum to be about £25 billion. 
 
In this report the focus has been shifted to tax not collected during a year as this 
makes the figure directly comparable with the data for tax avoidance and tax evasion, 
which was not previously the case. 
 
HMRC‟s data on tax debt collection for the years 2012/13 and 2013/14 is as follows, 
based on the National Audit Office‟s reportlvi on HMRC‟s accounts for 2013/14: 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
Source: National Audit Office  
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The amount of debt outstanding at HMRC has fallen in recent years. However, as will 
be noted from the above table, the amount of debt written off as irrecoverable or 
discharged during a year is growing. In 2013/14 this combined sum came to £18.2 
billion, which is the figure for debt considered appropriate for conclusion in this report 
on the tax gap even though HMRC would prefer to only refer to the lower sum of debt 
written off of £5.1 billion. 
 
The National Audit Office describe HMRC‟s explanations of debt written off, remitted 
and discharged as follows in their report from which figure 11 has been taken: 
 
Debt is written off in situations where there is no practical way to pursue the 
liability. Some write-offs occur automatically and are outside the department’s 
control, such as where the debtor is insolvent. 
 
Debt ‘remission’ (a concept unique to government) is where a department decides 
not to pursue a debt primarily on the grounds of value for money, i.e. the cost of 
pursuing it would be greater than the benefit, or it is not the most efficient use of 
limited resources, compared with other priorities.  
 
Discharged debt is where HMRC amends or cancels a debt as further information 
is received that determines the taxpayer’s final liability as being lower than the 
originally estimated figure. 
 
HMRC would appear to argue that debt discharged is the result of errors made by 
them in estimating sums owing. If that is true the error rate increased considerably in a 
year and was a major factor in that case in the growth in recognised debt arising 
between 2012/13 and 2013/14.  
 
Alternatively, these estimates of debt made were fair but the resources to pursue the 
debt that HMRC staff members had, in good faith, estimated to be due were not 
available and so the debt was discharged instead. Whichever explanation is true it 
shows that there is considerable reason to doubt that HMRC is correctly estimating 
tax owing and good reason to doubt that it has sufficient resources to recover the tax 
that is owed to it. In that case, and because of that doubt, it seems appropriate to 
include debt discharged within the UK tax gap on the same basis that tax written off 
and remitted is. 
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16. The tax gap: a summary 
 
In chapters 13, 14 and 15 estimates have been provided for the three main 
components of the UK tax gap. These are as follows: 
 
 £‟bn 
Tax evasion 85.0 
Tax avoidance  19.1 
Tax debt not recovered 18.2 
 122.3 
 
With the caveat noted in chapter 14 that the tax avoidance estimate included here 
may be cautious and underestimated, the likely UK tax gap in 2014/15 may be at least 
£122 billion in total in a year.  
 
To put this sum in context, £122 billion would pay for 6 sevenths of the NHS in a year 
– or its operation from Monday to Saturday, leaving just Sunday to be funded from 
elsewhere.  
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17. The HMRC resource crisis 
 
There are three fundamental reasons why there is a crisis with regard to tax evasion, 
tax avoidance and tax debt in the UK. The first is that HMRC do not have the 
resources needed to tackle this issue. The second is that the political will to tackle tax 
evasion no longer exists. The third, which follows inevitably from the second, is that 
the legislation HMRC needs to tackle the crisis of tax evasion in the UK is not 
available to it. This report will deal with each of these issues in turn before drawing 
the, by then obvious, conclusions and recommendations that flow from them as noted 
at the beginning of this report. 
 
The crisis of resources at HMRC should by now be well known and yet is still largely 
ignored within both political and social commentary on this issue. It would seem that it 
takes regular comment from PCS members sitting in the audience of Question Time to 
keep it in the public domain. 
 
This crisis of resources began when HMRC was created. In 2005 the then Inland 
Revenue and HM Customs & Excise were merged to form what became HMRC. The 
new organisation also had responsibility for collecting national insurance, which had at 
one time been the function of the then Department for Social Security, and for paying 
tax credits, where overlap of responsibility clearly existed with the Department for 
Work and Pensions. It does also undertake some tasks on behalf of the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills in connection with the minimum wage.  
 
One aim of the merger of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs & Excise would 
appear to have been to bring tax policy creation into the Treasury. This required the 
physical relocation of tax policy from the previous Inland Revenue offices in Somerset 
House into the new PFI funded Treasury building in Westminster.  
 
Another aim of the merger was to save costs. From the outset, as in almost all 
mergers, job cuts were on the agenda.  
 
It also seems that there was a desire when creating the new HMRC structure to 
significantly increase the influence of business on tax policy.  This neoliberal 
approach, which presumes that business knows best on all issues because of the 
supposed influence of competition on its policies, is reflected in the composition of 
HMRC‟s non-executive board of directors, all of whom are drawn from big business 
and who include former partners at two of the largest firms of global accountantslvii.   
 
Dealing solely with the policy of cutting staff to save costs in this section, it is very 
clear that this goal has been achieved. The HMRC head count according to its annual 
published accounts has from 2004-05 (the year before the merger) to 2012/13 (the 
most recent data available at the time of writing) been as follows: 
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Figure 12 
Source: HMRC accounts bar core department data pre 2008/09 which is author 
estimate 
 
The non-core department employees of HMRC largely work for the Valuations Office 
Agency, whose work largely relates to council taxation. 
 
Numbers have fallen dramatically, from over 92,000 in the core department in 2004/05 
to under 62,000 in 2012/13 according to HMRC‟s accounts.  
 
The 2014-16 Business plan for HMRC displays the data slightly differently, but the 
message is broadly similarlviii: 
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Figure 13 
Source: HMRC Business Plan 2014-16 
 
These cuts have all been aimed at reducing cost. This chart summarising changes in 
the HMRC budget in absolute and price adjusted terms comes from the same HMRC 
business plan: 
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Figure 14  
Source: HMRC Business Plan 2014-16 
 
HMRC say in their 2014-16 business plan that by the end of the 2015/16 tax year they 
will have no more than 52,000 staff, a cut of almost 43% in just over a decade. 
 
Based on data in the business plans of the individual departments within HMRC the 
cuts in staffing from 2014 to 2016 will be as follows: 
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Figure 15 
Sources: HMRC departmental business plans 2014-16 as per footnote, below8 
 
Astonishingly, this means that the rate of cuts being imposed upon HMRC is now 
growing, as this figure shows: 
 
                                                        
8
 The individual department data comes from their own business plans except for: 
a. Business tax, where the total number of staff in 2013/14 was not stated so a 
January 2014 total was used for opening data and adjusted for noted planned 
cuts; 
b. Central Tax and Strategy and Chief Financial Officer, where data was 
estimated from graphs; 
c. The 2016 total, which comes from the main business plan; 
d. Personal Tax, where no 2016 number was given, so a balancing number to 
equate the total to the HMRC aggregate was used.  
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Figure 16 
Source: Change on yearly totals in figures 14 and 15 expressed as a percentage 
of the previous year 
 
A trend line has been added to the graph highlighting this astonishing rate of cuts and 
emphasising that instead of the rate of change in staff levels at HMRC declining, as 
would be expected in most organisations as a process of integration evolves, it is 
instead increasing.  
 
The impact of this is obvious. When reading HMRC‟s business plans there is a 
recurring theme of low staff engagement that is a certain sign of poor morale. Indeed, 
it has been widely reported that HMRC has had the lowest staff morale in the whole 
civil service since the time of its creation in 2005lix. That has in turn led to high rates of 
resignationslx. That problem appears to have been particularly acute amongst 
experienced staff, a fact that is widely reported by HMRC staff to impact on the tax 
gap.  
 
This obvious difficulty with motivation amongst staff, which is considered serious 
enough to be listed as a threat to the achievement of the goals of the Personal Tax 
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division of HMRClxi, does need to be contextualised. Whilst it is obvious that as a 
result of some changes in work practices,, such as the online submission of tax 
returns, there has been a reduction in the need for staff engaged on a particular task 
this has not in any way reduced the overall need for resources to tackle the tax gap, to 
which task the people in question could have been redeployed instead of eliminating 
their jobs. The result is that the apparent increase in yield as a result of supposed 
increases in productivity at HMRC has been at the cost of an enormous impact on the 
quality of service supplied, and, of course, an increased tax gap. 
 
Other factors have also had an impact on supposed productivity, including  
simply demanding that staff work much harder than before by not replacing their 
colleagues who have left HMRC and yet demanding that the same work still be 
achieved despite that fact. Then there has been a process of withdrawing from the 
supply of public services. So first of all local tax offices have been closed, and then 
enquiry centres have shut whilst attempts are now being made to also cut 
employment in HMRC call centres by forcing taxpayers to communicate with HMRC 
on line, which many of them will find far too difficult. In addition a wide range of 
activities that have been in place to protect tax revenue are simply not now 
undertaken due to a shortage of resources, including many compliance investigations. 
All these facts have to be noted before considering data on trends in tax yield.  
 
That tax yield data is, of course, impacted by changes in both GDP and the value of 
money over time. The following data does, therefore, seek to unpick these trends and 
does so by starting from data published by HMRC on total taxes collected by yearlxii 
and headcount as noted above and then adjusting this first of all for inflation and then 
GDP using HM Treasury deflator datalxiii.  
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Figure 17 
Sources: As noted in text and endnotes.  
 
The apparent increase in yield is as shown in this graph: 
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Figure 18 
Source: Calculations in Figure 17 
 
Superficially this graph suggests that HMRC has achieved its objectives. It has 
collected what is, when the impacts of GDP and inflation are taken out of account, 
consistent tax yields both in cash terms and as a proportion of GDP with a falling 
headcount.  
 
This does, however, ignore the impact of cuts on the tax gap which this report 
suggests are substantially more significant than HMRC believe them to be simply 
because it massively underestimates that tax gap. It obviously also ignores the human 
costs on HMRC‟s employees and the potential yield that could be achieved were there 
adequate resources to address the different components of the tax gap properly. 
 
As importantly, HMRC also assumes that the trend is sustainable. This is almost 
certainly a mistaken assumption, firstly for the reasons of poor morale already noted; 
secondly because the pressure to achieve these results has been so great that for the 
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first time the members of the ARC, the union that represents senior staff at HMRC, 
went on strike in 2014, and thirdly because the quality of service supplied by HMRC 
has fallen dramatically over recent years.  
 
All these issues are important. When morale at HMRC is low enough for its entire staff 
to appear to be alienated from management there is something seriously wrong with 
the organisation and the aim of reducing the tax gap is unlikely to be achieved, but the 
issue of the quality of services provided does, perhaps, provide clearer indication of 
the impact of this crisis. The HMRC Customer Survey 2008 – 2013lxiv provides very 
clear evidence that over that period HMRC‟s so called „customers‟ (most of whom 
intensely dislike their description as such, and would rather be called „taxpayers‟ or 
„tax credit claimants‟) have had a reducing rate of satisfaction with the service they 
have received. It is not possible to produce all the evidence that supports that claim 
here but the following figures covering the three groups of users surveyed i.e. tax 
agents, small and medium sized companies and individual taxpayers, provide some 
clear support for this claim. 
 
Tax agents revealed the following trends with regard to reputation issues, which may 
be considered of particular significance for this group: 
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Figure 19 
Source: HMRC Customer Survey 2008 – 13 
 
Wherever a trend is shown it is downward and in some cases it will be noted that 
already poor perceptions have deteriorated further. 
 
The same is true of the following group of indicators on ease of access when 
appraised by small and medium sized enterprises: 
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Figure 20 
Source: HMRC Customer Survey 2008 – 13 
 
The trends in these cases are markedly downwards. This, almost certainly, is due to 
two factors. The first is the move to call centre-based operations across wide sectors 
of HMRC. The other may be the beginning of the HMRC local office closure 
programme noted further below.  
 
Finally, a sample from the survey on the perception of personal taxpayers also gives 
clear indication that this group is also increasingly dissatisfied with HMRC‟s service 
across the same range of indicators noted for tax agents: 
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Figure 21 
Source: HMRC Customer Survey 2008 – 13 
 
The signs here are also very clear: dissatisfaction with HMRC is growing steadily. 
Staff cuts are impacting upon perception of its services across the range of those to 
whom they are supplied. 
 
It is very likely that this situation will get worse over coming years as HMRC pursues it 
plans to cut staff numbers further. The first reason for this is to be found in its 
business plan for personal tax for the period 2014-16, where the majority of the staff 
cuts over this period will take place. In that plan HMRC say: 
 
[W]e will build and test an increasingly digital service, so that most of our 
customers can keep up with their tax affairs and payments online. HMRC is 
aiming for 70 per cent of all customer contact to be handled online by 2019 — 
and this is not just about technology: it means large-scale changes to the way 
we work, streamlining our back-office processes to meet the needs of 
customers wanting to self-serve. 
 Tax evasion in 2014   
  
 65 
It would be all too easy to miss the implications of this seemingly innocuous 
paragraph. What it actually means is that more than 5.5 million people should cease 
to make personal contact with HMRC over the next five years. They will, instead, be 
expected to handle all their relationships with the department, including all the queries 
they might have, through on line services. So, for example, it will generally be 
assumed that any of these people who have a query on their tax affairs will be able to 
solve it by working their way through pre-set HMRC enquiry menus without the 
guidance of any human being. There are three points to make as a result.  
 
a. First, there is no evidence that there is any desire on the part of these people 
to „self serve‟. If there was the market in supplying tax services in this country 
would not be as buoyant as it is. 
 
b. Second, this change in approach assumes that tax in the UK is simple enough 
to be reduced to some quite straightforward queries that can drive the 
algorithms in these enquiry systems, and there is no evidence that this is true. 
The reality is that the UK tax system is complex, as is widely recognised. 
 
c. Finally, there is an assumption that human contact can neither add value by 
putting people‟s minds at rest on tax issues nor can personal tax staff at 
HMRC as a result of their work help collect the right amount of tax owing by 
UK taxpayers by using their own ability to appraise situations and ask the right 
questions which the taxpayer may not, quite reasonably, be able to formulate. 
 
The result is that the UK tax system will become increasingly remote from the UK 
taxpayer. This is a trend already seen in the  closure by HMRC of all the UK enquiry 
centres that they run. That enquiry centre network, consisting of 281 offices, was 
closed in June 2014, putting the livelihoods of 1,300 HMRC staff at risk.  
 
That closure process also means that the principle users of that service, many of 
whom are unemployed or are those on low incomes such as migrant workers, 
pensioners and child benefit / child tax credit claimants, many of whom will have 
limited internet access, are being denied the service they need.  
 
During 2012, 2.5 million taxpayers visited HMRC enquiry centres and 340,885 made a 
face-to-face appointment with a member of staff in order to comply with their tax 
duties and receive advice on their benefit entitlement. They will now, instead, have to 
make telephone enquiries and in future on line enquiries.  
 
It is, in this context, important to note that the Public Accounts Committee has been 
critical of telephone call handling by HMRC and set them a performance target of 
answering 90% of calls for 2013-14. Performance for December 2013 was 76.2%. 
89.84% of calls went unanswered on the tax credit renewal date on 31 July 2013. The 
staff cuts in personal tax directorate, now announced, are likely to significantly 
increase this call failure rate.  
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What is apparent then is that these reforms are not about service reform: they are 
about service withdrawal. The risk of increased errors arising as a result is very high 
indeed. As the same House of Commons Committee noted in 2013lxv: 
 
In 2011-12, 20 million phone calls were not answered. It cost the callers £136 
million while they waited to speak to an adviser. And, against its target of 
responding to 80% of letters within 15 days, the department managed to reply 
to just 66%. This is an abysmal record. 
 
HMRC’s new target of answering 80% of calls within five minutes is woefully 
inadequate and unambitious. The department should set a more demanding 
target in the short term and a long-term target that is much closer to the 
industry standard of answering 80% of calls within 20 seconds. 
 
Concerns about the consequences of understaffing are also expressed by staff across 
HMRC‟s operating divisions. Whilst it is true that business tax and the enforcement 
and compliance divisions are to suffer smaller proportionate cuts in staff over the next 
two years than the personal tax division, the reductions are, in both cases, significant, 
at more than 8% of business tax staff and over 9% of enforcement and compliance 
staff. These cuts run completely counter to the claim by HMRC that it is investing 
more in tackling tax avoidance and evasion: it is impossible to tackle either without 
having sufficient staff available to undertake this activity.  
 
Anecdotal evidence on the impact of these cuts is significant, including reports from 
many VAT officers of the near absence of staff to undertake routine audit inspections 
of VAT registered traders, and the potential closure of VAT offices in large parts of the 
country. The effective management of such tax systems does depend upon the 
existence of a significant deterrence effect: the absence of audit visits by HMRC VAT 
staff removes any chance that this effect will have any meaning in the future. There 
will be an inevitable, and significant, loss of yield as a result. The fall in the VAT gap 
forecast in the 2014 budgetlxvi looks to be decidedly wishful thinking as a 
consequence. 
 
At the same time, evidence secured by Tax Research UK has shown that as 
resources available to HMRC reduce significantly the department has changed its 
attitude towards some aspects of corporation tax assessment and collectionlxvii. As a 
consequence, whereas in the past HMRC assumed that if a company did not contact 
it shortly after its incorporation then it would be required to submit corporation tax 
returns it now assumes that a failure on the part of the company to supply information 
on its potential trading soon after incorporation is indication that no taxable activity is 
taking place and by default, as a consequence, that company is not asked to supply 
corporation tax returns for a period of up to five years. The result is that HMRC 
assume that no tax gap can arise from the unrecorded activities of such companies, 
but the reality is that for the very many companies that are aware of this possibility this 
is simply the grant of a licence to defraud the UK‟s tax authority. A lack of resources 
combined with the decision to turn a blind eye has created a situation where data is 
not collected to prove that there is a problem, but that is not evidence of its absence. 
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What all this evidence suggests is that HMRC has been run since its creation as if it is 
a government cost centre. The assumption has always been that it is a burden on the 
taxpayer whose costs must be reduced. That appears to be wholly inappropriate. 
HMRC is the government's main revenue generation department, and it should be 
seen as such. Despite that, HMRC has continually failed to work out what the potential 
tax take that it should collect might be, and that is a major failure on its part. As a 
consequence it has failed to invest in appropriate reforms and the necessary level of 
staffing required to collect the revenue that it is missing.  
 
The 2010 PCS report on tax evasion highlighted these concerns, and suggested that 
there was a compelling case for investing more resource into HMRC rather than 
cutting staff. What was, at that time, a matter that appeared urgent to those involved in 
the front line of tax collection now appears to be critical.  
 
Staff cuts have now been pursued to the point that frontline staff addressing critical 
issues with direct impact upon tax collection have been made redundant or not 
replaced when they leave HMRC‟s service. In addition, the pace of staff cuts, which 
slowed from 2011 to 2013, has now increased dramatically and the impact for very 
many people who have to, by law, engage with HMRC will be significant. Indeed, for 
many taxpayers, the chance of personal service has simply disappeared, either 
because of the closure of Enquiry Centres or because their questions will in future be 
dealt with online without any real prospect of human intervention. At the same time, 
the number of staff available to undertake tax investigations and enquiries is falling 
steadily. 
 
The apparent tax yield per member of staff has, of course, risen as a result of staff 
cuts since the time that HMRC was created. That was almost inevitable given the 
scale of the cuts in staffing that have occurred. What is, however, noticeable is that 
HMRC's performance in terms of overall tax collection, when adjusted for changes in 
GDP and inflation, is not significant. The inevitable conclusion is that there has been 
little, if any, real impact on the tax gap despite the claims made by HMRC in recent 
years.  
 
It is timely to repeat the call for more resources. The case for investing in more staff in 
HMRC is compelling. The likely yield from further cuts in staffing is very small: even 
HMRC's business plan makes that clear. The total potential savings from job and cost 
cutting to 2016 are not expected to be more than £300 million a year. In contrast, even 
HMRC admit in their business plan that the yield on investment in staff is at least 7 to 
1: ARC as noted below, think it much higher.  The total tax evasion gap that this report 
suggests exists is over £80 billion a year. When personal and corporate tax avoidance 
is taken into account the total tax gap, without considering that, is in excess of £100 
billion. 
 
No one is suggesting that this tax gap can be completely closed as a result of this 
increased investment. Tax crime will always exist and it would appear that whatever 
tax rate is offered to business and its advisers they will persist in trying to find ways of 
avoiding their obligations. That said that the absence of sufficient staff an HMRC, 
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which is going to become readily apparent to a great many taxpayers with the closure 
of local offices, can only exacerbate this trend.  
 
It is also to important to note that there is compelling evidence from the USA, noted by 
Tax Research UK in its report on the UK shadow economy published in 2014, that the 
presence of deterrence affects has an impact on the rate of tax declaration made by 
people who would otherwise be inclined to hide their liabilities from their tax authority.  
 
HMRC already admit that on average over five years more than 40% of all self-
employed people‟s tax returns under declare their tax liabilitieslxviii. In the absence of 
contact, checking, and the presence of audit staff working in local communities it is 
inevitable that this rate of default will increase. 
 
ARC who represent 2,600 senior staff at HMRC – has estimated that an investment of 
just £312million in HMRC will deliver additional revenues to the UK Exchequer of 
more than £8.26 billion – a return on investment of more than 26 to 1lxix. If such a yield 
is possible on so limited an investment then it has to be worth spending a 
considerably greater sum when the losses that HMRC is facing are so enormous. 
 
How big does that sum need to be? This is, of course, a matter of judgement and 
depends, as the next chapter of this report suggests, upon the political will of those 
allocating resources to HMRC. It is, however, suggested here that the sum required is 
a great deal more than then the £312 million that ARC suggest appropriate – which 
represents about 8.5% of the current HMRC budget and would deliver about 1,300 
additional jobs.  
 
That investment must be made in a number of ways. Firstly, for all the reasons 
already noted, the closure of the Enquiry Centres should be reversed: these are an 
essential front line HMRC service to the community. .  
 
Secondly, the job cuts planned for the next two or more years should be cancelled. 
When HMRC is already failing to meet its delivery targets to taxpayers it is absurd to 
cut resources still further on the assumption that taxpayers can „self serve‟ themselves 
when it comes to tax when there is no evidence that this is the case.  
 
Over 8,000 jobs would be secured as a result, most in personal tax. Instead of cuts 
additional staff are in fact needed to ensure existing targets are met. It is likely that 
several thousand more personnel are required if HMRC is to provide an acceptable 
standard of service to meet the standard demanded by, for example, the Public 
Accounts Committee.  
 
Thirdly, saving jobs is not enough; the potential yield from investment in tackling the 
tax gap is high. As a consequence areas where it is clear that additional staff will 
make a significant difference to the effectiveness of HMRC in collecting tax revenues 
are suggested next. 
 
The first such area is in debt collection, where it is clear that the public have 
considerable concern about HMRC‟s plans to share data with private sector debt 
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collection agencies. This programme of outsourcing debt collection should be 
cancelled and all debt collection should be brought in house. There has been a long 
running problem in collecting debt owing to HMRC because of significant under 
resourcing in this area. This has been the subject of significant criticism by the House 
of Commons Public Accounts Committee.  
 
Significant recruitment is required in this area and extra investment in resources is 
necessary. At any time between approximately £15 billion -  £20 billion is owing to 
HMRC, the timely recovery of this sum would reduce the size of the national debt, so 
effective action on this issue is essential. 
 
Secondly, as many PCS members know, HMRC is too readily inclined to make tax 
repayments to taxpayers without properly investigating the validity of their claim to 
receive them. This makes no sense at all when the subsequent prospect of recovering 
that tax repayment, if it is shown not to be due, is limited. As such it is essential the 
additional staff be allocated to checking all repayment claims by HMRC. 
 
Thirdly, it is vital that HMRC staff should remain at work in the local communities that 
they serve across the UK. Tax represents a key component in the relationship 
between people and their government (that ownership of HMRC by the people of this 
country being far too easily forgotten). In that case a visible HMRC presence in towns 
and cities across the country is essential. This will be completely lost if HMRC's 
activities are centralised into just a few regional offices within the UK, as is currently 
planned.  
 
In that case it is essential that these local offices be appropriately staffed. Many PCS 
staff are, for example, deeply concerned about cuts in the number of VAT offices 
available to undertake local audits of traders books and records when this is an 
essential control in ensuring that tax is properly paid and that the shadow economy is 
kept under control. This presence has to be maintained and reinforced if the tax gap is 
to be reduced.  
 
That same process of adequately staffing local offices would also ensure that key risk 
areas are properly tackled by HMRC. Over the last few years HMRC has made much 
of the task forces that it has created to tackle tax evasion but it has always been hard 
to explain why it has been, for example, worth targeting taxi drivers in Yorkshire whilst 
ignoring taxi drivers in the rest of the country. Task forces have undoubtedly raised 
revenue, but they represent gestures instead of concerted and specific continuing 
actions to tackle the tax gap. If such issues need addressing they need to be 
addressed on a concerted basis, not in the token gesture way that task force activity 
appears to represent, and that will also require investment, albeit with an almost 
guaranteed return. 
 
In combination these investments will require more spending than the £300 million 
ARC think is necessary at present, which they think will deliver extra revenue in 
excess of £8 billion a year with a yield of £26 for every £1 invested. It is, of course, 
unlikely that the noted rate of return could be maintained on all additional investment; 
that would be unrealistic. But, even taking this into account it is likely that if instead of 
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imposing cuts on HMRC an additional £1 billion over and above that indicated to be 
appropriate by ARC was to be spent, bringing total annual spending to about £5 
billion, then the potential total yield to HMRC from tackling both tax evasion and tax 
avoidance would increase significantly and might easily exceed £20 billion per annum, 
including the sum already estimated by ARC. In that case the rate of return on the 
additional £1 billion proposed would still be about £12 for every £1 invested. It is hard 
to believe that almost any organisation, anywhere, would refuse to consider such a 
yield. It is also worth noting that costs on this basis would be still be somewhat lower 
for HMRC as a whole than they were, after inflation is taken into account, when it was 
first created.  
 
The key to achieving this goal is, however, the existence of political will to tackle this 
issue, and it is to this matter that this report turns next.  
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18. The crisis of political will 
 
It is a fact now universally acknowledged that there is a tax gap in the UK. Whilst the 
term would hardly have been recognised a decade ago it is now officially the number 
one priority of our tax authority to close this gaplxx. Official rhetoric and political will 
are, however, not the same thing and whatever HMRC‟s stated objectives might be 
the current structure of the organisation means that it is acutely aware of the political 
preferences of those who provide its funding. 
 
There has, unfortunately, been a strong anti-tax rhetoric prevalent in UK politics for 
some time. Take, for example, this quote from a speech by Chancellor of the 
Exchequer George Osborne to the annual dinner of the Federation of Small 
Businesses in 2012lxxi: 
 
[W]e are steadily restoring Britain’s competitiveness, as tax rates come down 
and the regulatory burden is pushed back. This year, we re-entered the top ten 
list of the best places in the world to do business. 
 
The implication is very clear and is repeated time after time by government ministers, 
backbenchers and, in fairness, some members of the Opposition. What is being said 
is that tax, and its associated regulation, is an obstacle to the effectiveness of the 
operation of British business. What is again, very clearly implied, is that the fewer 
such obstacles that are placed in the way of business the better off the country will be. 
 
This is an inappropriate assumption. The importance of business to the UK economy 
is, of course, recognised but the proper and consistent application of regulations in 
accordance with the law is something quite different from imposing  “unnecessary 
burdens” upon business. It is, instead, the creation of a level playing field on which all 
businesses can operate where no preference is given to those who cheat over those 
who do not.  
 
It is an unfortunate fact that the current system of regulation of tax and companies in 
the UK does not create this level playing field that is an essential foundation for the 
creation of prosperity within the UK economy. So, for example, Tax Research UK has 
already revealed during the course of 2014 thatlxxii: 
 
a. More than 300,000 companies are, on average, struck off the Register of 
Companies each year and few of these have submitted the accounts that are 
due to be filed by them before being struck off. The number of investigations 
by either Companies House or HMRC into these companies that are struck off 
appears to be very low; 
 
b. More than 400,000 companies a year do, on average, fail to file annual return 
forms with the Registrar of Companies, including those struck off; 
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c. 340,000 sets of accounts due to the Registrar of Companies were probably not 
filed in 2012-13, including those due by companies struck off; 
 
d. HMRC currently fail to request corporation tax returns from at least 650,000 
companies each year that might be trading. Their checking on those 
companies that say they are not trading appears to be minimal; 
 
e. Of the companies asked to submit corporation tax returns in 2011/12 more 
than 270,000 did not do so. Whilst these companies were penalised for not 
doing so almost none of those fines were paid. 
 
This is a record of failure as a result of HMRC and Companies House having too few 
resources as a result of a lack of political will to provide them.  
 
This evidence suggests that time and again an assumption is made that a company is 
not trading, and therefore need not comply with its obligations, when no enquiry has 
even been made to support that suggestion. This failure appears to be driven by the 
apparent overwhelming desire to reduce the „burdens of regulation‟ on business. The 
consequence of this approach is that is now acknowledged by HMRC that more than 
10% of the VAT that should be paid in this country each year is not collected by it 
(with the EU suggesting that this figure is somewhat higher) and yet the necessary 
investment to discover which companies are responsible for this omission is not being 
made.  
 
This omission is the consequence of a decision that is itself, inevitably, politically 
motivated. It would seem that there is a collective fear of the UK small business 
community amongst politicians who seem to believe that any suggestion that they 
might make that implies some small businesses are not making payment of the tax 
that they owe will be taken as a slight upon the whole sector.  
 
The clear implication of the work undertaken on the tax gap by both HMRC and Tax 
Research UK is that the majority of small businesses in the UK honestly pay all the 
taxes that are owed by them in an appropriate and timely fashion but that there are 
some who are inclined to dishonesty. They make only partial disclosure of their tax 
liabilities and whilst it is only a minority (but in tax lost terms, a significant one) some 
evade their obligations to pay altogether.  
 
It is an obvious statement of fact that those businesses that do not make payment of 
all or part of the tax that they owe do as a consequence obtain an unfair economic 
advantage over those honest businesses that make payment of all their tax liabilities.  
 
That is because those dishonest businesses can firstly charge less to their customers 
(a fact that is widely known in some business sectors where VAT evasion appears 
commonplace) and secondly because, by not paying tax, they can actually invest 
more in their businesses than those companies that do make the payments 
demanded of them and therefore have, as a consequence, less capital available for 
investment purposes. 
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It is a perverse situation where an apparent fear of upsetting the small business 
community on the part of politicians has led to a situation where the viability of many 
small businesses in the UK is now compromised by the existence of a substantial 
shadow economy which HMRC do not have the resources to challenge. It is for this 
reason that a change in the rhetoric on both tax avoidance and tax evasion in the UK 
is essential.  
 
There have only ever been, all too brief, hints of this possibility. So, for example, 
David Cameron said in January 2013 thatlxxiii: 
 
We do need a debate in this country, not only what is against the law - that’s 
tax evasion, that is against the law, that’s illegal and if you do that the Inland 
Revenue will come down on you like a tonne of bricks - but what is 
unacceptable in terms of really aggressive tax avoidance. 
 
Because some people say to me, ‘Well, it’s all within the law; you’re obeying 
the law, it’s okay'. Well, actually there are lots of things that are within the law 
[that] we don’t do because actually we have some moral scruples about them 
and I think we need this debate about tax too. 
 
I’m not asking people to pay massive rates of tax. We’ve got a low top rate of 
income tax now; we’ve got a low rate of corporation tax now; we are a fair tax 
country. But I think it’s fair then to say to business, you know, we’re playing fair 
by you; you’ve got to play fair by us. 
 
These comments, made at the very outset of the UK's G8 chairmanship, have not 
resulted in any effective delivery by the Government  on the expectations that were 
raised at that time. Instead what has happened instead is that, as The Public 
Accounts Committee, chaired by Margaret Hodge has saidlxxiv: 
 
[HMRC]  is too complacent about the service it provides to customers 
 
It has also noted that: 
 
There is currently a complete lack of transparency about why multinationals 
pay so little corporation tax. Global companies structure their companies in 
ways that are impenetrable to the public and HMRC disclose very little about 
their approach to collecting tax from them. This undermines public confidence 
in the tax system and in HMRC which could have a negative impact for wider 
tax compliance. 
 
David Cameron‟s talk is very hollow indeed, and that has to change. What has to 
happen is that politicians in the UK now need to talk about tax justice, and like 
Margaret Hodge, have to mean it. When that happens the resources to deliver on the 
promises that politicians make will be delivered to HMRC. Until then it is unsurprising 
that Margaret Hodge has become a champion for many and even Tax Personality of 
the Year for 2014lxxv. It is time for other politicians to follow her lead.  
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19. The need for new legislation 
 
The additional resources that are needed and the political will required to beat tax 
evasion noted in the previous two chapters are important, but they may not be enough 
to beat tax evasion by themselves. In some cases additional legislative resources are 
needed to assist HMRC beat tax evasion. 
 
The art of a good tax system is to encourage as many people as possible to 
voluntarily declare their income for tax purposes without any intervention on the part of 
a tax authority being needed. Research in the USAlxxvi has shown that there is the 
greatest chance of this happening if a taxpayer knows that the tax authorities are likely 
to have knowledge of the income stream that they should be declaring. So, for 
example, income taxed under PAYE is almost invariably declared on tax returns but 
that from self-employment is subject to a much more significant failure rate.  
 
The aim of legislative reform in this case is, therefore, to encourage all taxpayers to 
think that the chance of their income being known to HMRC is as high as possible. 
This means that the recommendations made here are for measures to improve the 
information available to tax authorities.  
 
As such the first recommendation made here repeats that made by Tax Research UK 
in its earlier report on the UK shadow economy in which it saidlxxvii: 
 
Banks and other financial services providers (including accountants and lawyers) 
who have a duty in money laundering law to identify the ownership of the 
companies for whom they act, should be required to report to HMRC and 
Companies House annually the identity of all the companies for whom they act 
that have bank accounts or other indications of trade, with bank account numbers 
being supplied. 
 
The advantage of this should be obvious. This disclosure would make it immediately 
apparent to HM Revenue & Customs which companies are likely to be trading in the 
UK and, as a result, which companies must be required to submit corporation tax 
returns.  
 
There will, of course, be false negative reports in the case of those companies 
banking offshore, but the fact that the system may not be perfect does not mean it 
should not be introduced. It is vital that information on the companies likely to be 
trading in the UK is available to HMRC. 
 
It is also very important to note that this exchange of information is something for 
which there is now in existence a very clear precedent, and that it will have almost no 
cost to implement. In both cases this is because of the change in approach made in 
the last few years towards what is called automatic information exchange between the 
UK and other major countries and tax havens.  
 Tax evasion in 2014   
  
 76 
 
Under these new arrangements, which have, in no small part, become the 
international norm, banks in tax havens (and in the UK) are required to hold 
information on who really owns the companies to which they provide services and to 
notify their central tax authority if that owner lives in another country. That central tax 
authority is then in turn required to advise the other country in question of the 
existence of that account arrangement so that they can use that information as an 
opportunity to charge tax, if they think it appropriate.  
 
Since all these arrangements are reciprocal and now exist not only between the UK 
and tax havens but between the UK and most EU member states as well as with the 
USA and other G7 member countries, all the data that is required to make this 
information available at a domestic level to HMRC must already exist in UK banks. It 
therefore follows that the cost of implementing the domestic disclosure regime 
recommended will be minimal. Why it has not been proposed for domestic use before 
now is hard to understand.  
 
As a result of this information being available further legislative changes would then 
be required: 
 
HMRC should be legally required to demand a corporation tax return from all 
companies if they have been advised that it has a bank account. 
 
In other words, the discretion that HMRC currently has to not demand corporation tax 
returns should be removed in these cases.  
 
That then leads to the need for a further power: 
 
HMRC should be given powers to approach banks and other financial service 
providers known to have had contact with a company if that company does not 
submit a corporation tax return within three months of the time allowed by law, to 
require the provision of information, such as bank statements. This would let 
HMRC prepare estimated tax demands to be paid by the company in the absence 
of accounts and corporation tax returns. 
 
It is unacceptable that banking secrecy should be used to prevent proper tax 
assessments being raised on UK companies. A long campaign has been fought, and 
is now being won, to ensure that data is available on the companies owned and run by 
UK resident people in tax havens. It would be absurd if more data were available in 
those cases in future than might be readily available to HMRC in the case of UK 
registered companies.  This proposal addresses that risk.  
 
That though does not overcome the obstacle that the money to pay tax could have 
been stripped from a company by its directors leaving it unable to pay its bill. Power 
must be taken to ensure that the tax is paid nonetheless: 
 
The tax liabilities of companies who have failed to submit tax returns to HMRC 
should be the personal liabilities of the directors of the company and all its owners 
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who have more than 25 per cent of the share capital as well as the company itself. 
In this way the limited liability of companies would not permit deliberate tax abuse 
as it does at present because those responsible for that abuse would become 
personally liable to make payment of any sums they have defrauded. 
 
Since banks must hold data on whose these directors and owners really are, under 
money laundering regulations, power should be made available to ensure that 
information on their identity can be passed by them to HMRC in these cases to ensure 
that tax is paid.  
 
The problem of Companies House striking off companies before they can be pursued 
to pay their tax bills has also to be tackled. It should be required that the data supplied 
by banks and other financial services providers on which companies have bank 
accounts also be supplied to Companies House and that by law: 
 
The proposed public register of the beneficial ownership of companies should be 
checked by Companies House with the data supplied to it by banks and other 
financial services providers to ensure that accurate information is published on 
that register. The annual return fee for companies (currently £13 a year) should be 
increased to cover the costs of checking and enforcing this disclosure. Increasing 
this fee to £30 a year would increase the resources available to Companies House 
by almost 60% but also make sure it could do its job effectively, and help it to beat 
fraudulent use of companies in the UK. 
 
As a result of the supply of this data the following should also be enacted: 
 
Companies House should not be allowed to strike off a company until that 
company has supplied accounts covering all its periods of trading;  
 
HMRC should be required to object to the striking off of any company whilst tax 
liabilities owing by it remain outstanding;  
 
HMRC and Companies House should be provided with the resources they need, 
including increased staffing, to enforce these laws since the cost of enforcement 
will be vastly less than the potential sums raised. 
 
Taken together, these powers to demand data from banks to verify the identity of 
companies trading in the UK economy, and to require that data be demanded from 
those banks and other service providers when the companies themselves fail to 
supply it coupled with directors and shareholders being made personally liable in the 
event of their failure to do so, should substantially increase the deterrent effects 
available within the UK for those considering using companies to evade tax. 
 
This, though, does not solve the problem of tax evasion in some other areas. For 
example, recent and welcome measures for improved information exchange with the 
UK‟s tax havens and the endorsement of an enhanced European Union Savings Tax 
Directive within Europe have created the prospect of enhanced measures to identify 
offshore tax evasion being available in the near future. 
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What is, however, vital is that HMRC be given the resources needed to process and 
use the data to be supplied under the new arrangements. This is more important than 
securing additional legislation to tackle offshore at present. Data without the resources 
being available to use it is useless. This, then, only adds to the case for enhanced 
investment in HMRC. 
 
In addition, with regard to trading by the self employed, including the millions of UK 
landlords, there is very clearly a need for a registration scheme to replicate the data 
provision arrangements suggested above for companies where banks must be 
required to automatically supply information on those that they maintain bank 
accounts for. All self employed people and landlords are at present required to notify 
HMRC of their having commenced trading within three months of their having done 
so, but of course many do not. However, with only a little legislation a method for 
ensuring information on potential traders who have not registered could be made 
available to HMRC by the UK‟s banks. 
 
That would also mean that in every case where a person advises that they have self-
employed or rental income HMRC should be required to issue the taxpayer in 
question with a unique tax reference number (UTR). This is usually done now but in 
some cases may not be: some taxpayers manage such income  solely through their 
PAYE reference. If this were done then any taxpayer with self employed or rental 
income should be legally required to advise any bank managing funds in their behalf 
of that fact. This, it should be stressed, would not only cover banks, but also those 
processing credit card data and organisations such as PayPal. This would then create 
the possibility of those banks and other organisations being required to declare in turn 
to HMRC, at least once a year, the names and addresses of all those people for 
whom they manage funds, with the UTR of which they have been advised also being 
disclosed by them as part of that process. In this way the scheme for companies is 
replicated, but that is insufficient for the self-employed. Banks and other payment 
service providers should also be required to provide an annual declaration to HMRC 
of those persons who they think they may be handing payments from the proceeds of 
trade for whether or not those persons have advised a UTR and the fact they are self-
employed to their bank, or not. This is not an especially hard thing for a bank to 
identify. Employees tend to receive payments at regular intervals of fairly regular 
amounts. So do those in receipt of benefits. But the self-employed have erratic bank 
lodgments.  
 
Of course such a procedure is not guaranteed to deliver perfect data to HMRC on 
those who are self employed, or not. It is instead intended to create data, relatively 
easily prepared and supplied, to enable a deterrence programme to be put in place by 
HMRC to reduce the temptation to people to not declare their income. This would, of 
course, require additional HMRC resources, but the tax gap will never be closed 
without them. It is deterrence and investigation that minimises tax gaps: the two must 
run hand in hand. 
 
When it comes to other areas of the tax gap, some, such as the proceeds of crime, 
may well be best covered by the above disclosure regimes. Others, such as capital 
gains losses may also be caught by bank disclosure requirements but with regard to 
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most of these areas, more resources for HMRC are the answer to closing the tax gap, 
as is the redesign of inheritance tax to make arrangements with regard to that tax 
considerably harder to hide. That redesign is beyond the scope of this report. Until it 
happens enhanced resourcing is the way to locate more inheritance tax that is due.  
 
In all cases though the message is the same: data plus resources increase tax yield. 
More resources within the existing system of taxation will undoubtedly increase yield, 
for example by increasing the number of audits undertaken. But additional data can 
considerably enhance the effectiveness of such arrangements. In that case combining 
the two makes perfect sense if the tax gap is to be beaten.  
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